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ABSTRACT 
The Arctic environment is in a state of flux and the U.S. government must be prepared to 
handle the evolution and capitalize on the opportunities. Once barren and desolate, the 
Arctic is slowly coming to life with industry and commerce brought about by receding 
ice conditions. Along with that comes the need for a comprehensive and actionable Arctic 
policy. The other Arctic nations that ring the North Pole are quickly adapting to the 
shifting Arctic. Unlike the U.S., they have established Arctic policies, are implementing 
plans to operate in the region, and taking advantage of the opportunities that this new 
frontier has to offer.  
The U.S. framework is the National Strategy for the Arctic Region. The plan is 
short on detail and aspirational in nature. It lacks clear direction and authority. The U.S. 
has yet to commit to its role as an Arctic nation. The U.S. Arctic lacks infrastructure such 
as a deep-water port, a joint military base, and additional heavy icebreaker assets. 
Additionally, there is no lead agency that has authority and funding to carry out U.S. 
Arctic objectives. Under the current state of affairs, the U.S. is vulnerable to security, 
economic, and sovereignty issues in the Arctic.  
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A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
What is the current state of U.S. Arctic policy, what are the gaps as compared 
with other nations in the region, and what improvements could be made if any? 
B. PROBLEM SPACE 
The Arctic environment is in great flux, and the U.S. government must be 
prepared to handle the changes and capitalize on the opportunities. The U.S. Arctic coast, 
once barren and desolate, is slowly coming to life with industry and commerce brought 
about by receding ice conditions; scientific studies show the polar ice caps have 
decreased by 25 percent over the past 35 years.1 Along with that, comes the need for a 
comprehensive and actionable Arctic policy. 
The other Arctic nations that ring the North Pole are quickly adapting to the 
shifting Arctic. Unlike the U.S., they have established Arctic policies, are implementing 
plans to operate in the region, and taking advantage of the opportunities that this new 
frontier has to offer. Countries such as Denmark and Norway are engaging 
diplomatically, and enhancing military capability to ensure sovereignty in the Arctic. 
Russia, the largest country in the Arctic, is hard at work capitalizing on the region to help 
strengthen their economy and build security and sovereignty. Likewise, Canada is 
enhancing military capability, while ensuring their economic and security needs are met. 
Moreover, non-Arctic nations, like China, India, and Singapore are taking an active 
interest in the Arctic and the opportunities it presents. 
The other Arctic nations are working within the construct of the 1982 United 
Nations Law of the Sea Treaty (UNCLOS) to advance national interests. The U.S. has not 
yet acceded to UNCLOS, and trails its Arctic neighbors in regards to national policy and 
direction for the Arctic. Groups such as the Arctic Council (of which the U.S. is a 
                                                 
1 Heather Conley and Jamie Kraut, “U.S. Strategic Interest in the Arctic An Assessment of Current 
Challenges and New Opportunities for Cooperation,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (April 
2010), 1. 
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participant) have been established to cooperatively deal with issues on pan-Arctic interest 
of a non-military nature. Unfortunately, the Arctic Council is merely consensus-based 
and lacks any real power to enact change or sanction a member. United States Arctic 
policy remains weak in protecting U.S. sovereignty and security interests. When 
contrasted with the Arctic policy of other nations, it is obvious that improvements need to 
be made to guard U.S. interests While the U.S. procrastinates in taking its rightful place 
in the Arctic, Russia has made a claim to the North Pole based on their extended 
continental shelf claim, and non-Arctic states (China and India) are building polar 
icebreakers. 
The current U.S. framework for Arctic policy is the National Strategy for the 
Arctic Region.2  The plan is short on detail, and is mainly aspirational in nature. It lacks 
clear direction and authority to ensure U.S. Arctic objectives are met. The U.S. has yet to 
commit to its role as an Arctic nation, which is further exacerbated by the lack of 
accession to UNCLOS. The U.S. Arctic lacks infrastructure such as a deep-water port, a 
joint military base, and additional heavy icebreaker assets. Additionally, there is no lead 
agency that has authority and funding to carry out U.S. Arctic objectives. Under the 
current state of affairs, the U.S. is vulnerable to security, economic, and sovereignty 
issues in the Arctic.  
C. THESIS ROADMAP 
This thesis we will explore the literature concerning Arctic policies from both the 
U.S. and abroad. Next, we will review the current state of U.S. Arctic policy from the 
role of the Arctic Council to the lack UNCLOS. This will be followed by an overview of 
the current state of maritime governance in the Arctic by reviewing and analyzing the 
Arctic strategies from the seven Arctic nations. Canada, Denmark, Norway, Iceland, 
Sweden, Finland, and Russia have well-established Arctic policies based on the role of 
the Arctic in the geo-politics of each nation. Their respective Arctic plans are motivated 
by many factors including: sovereignty, security, economic development of natural 
                                                 
2 The White House, “The National Strategy for the Arctic Region,” May 10, 2013, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/nat_arctic_strategy.pdf. 
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resource, protection of the changing eco-system, and the opportunity to build global 
influence. Only by analyzing the strategies of the neighboring Arctic states can the gaps 
in U.S. Arctic strategy be recognized. We will identify the hazards and trade-offs of the 
current state of U.S. Arctic governance. We will then look closely at some of the 
identified gaps in U.S. policy in contrast to the other nations ringing the North Pole. 
Finally, the thesis will examine some specific policy recommendations for the United 
States in the Arctic. 
D. METHOD 
Data Sources: The sources and evidence for this research included government 
publications and documents, professional, educational literature, and internal government 
reports on Arctic policy. Background information on U.S. policy was also gleaned from 
private conversations with several subject-matter expert colleagues. 
Type and Mode of Analysis: This thesis is a policy analysis conducted with the 
eight-step process outlined in Barbach’s “A Practical Guide for Policy Analysis.”  The 
steps are:  define the problem, assemble the evidence, construct the alternatives, select the 
criteria, project the outcomes, confront the trade-offs, decide, and tell your story. 
Specifically, review the current state of U.S. Arctic Policy as compared to that of other 
Arctic nations in order to identify gaps, assess maritime traffic trends, and establish a set 
of policy recommendations to address them. Particular areas of weakness in U.S. policy, 
from the beginning of this inquiry, were the impact of the U.S. not ratifying the U.N. Law 
of the Sea Treaty (UNCLOS), lack of U.S. icebreaking capability, the lack of deep-water 
port in the Arctic, and the lack of a permanent federal presence (Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS)/ United States Coast Guard (USCG) and Department of 
Defense (DoD). For example, the increase in maritime activity as measured by the 
Automatic Information System (AIS) and other collection sources will likely result in the 
loss of life due to a lack of Search and Rescue assets. Environmental and property 
damage from a maritime transportation accident or Arctic drilling would likely result 
from a lack of quick response capability. A spill or maritime casualty would in turn also 
set back economic development, wildlife, and Native Alaskan subsistence living. In 
 4 
addition, the thesis contrasted the costs to the cost of establishing a year-round 
DHS/Coast Guard maritime presence in the Arctic.   
Output:  This thesis is largely an analysis of the current U.S. Arctic Framework; 
since the U.S. Arctic is a maritime region, and given the researcher’s professional 
placement in the maritime context, the research questions are posed and explored through 
a maritime lens which is a balance of security, economic and infrastructure needs (as 
opposed to a strictly political or economic lens). Specifically, the policy 
recommendations made at the end of this project are intended for Homeland Security, 
U.S. Coast Guard, and Defense Department consumers to form the basis of a new, 
competitive, and effective U.S. Arctic policy.  
Criteria by which to judge existing policies: The Arctic is opening up and as a 
result economic opportunities such as oil/gas exploration, maritime transportation, and 
maritime tourism are expanding exponentially. As commercial opportunities increase in 
the region, the U.S. needs an effective policy to deal with this new frontier that up until a 
few short years ago was covered with ice and had little commercial interest and economic 
value. 
From a DHS/CG and DoD perspective, the increased commerce brings a 
challenge to ensure agencies like the CG (that has 11 statutory missions in U.S. and 
international waters) have a presence in the Artic to carry out those missions.3 Currently, 
with no permanent USCG/DoD presence lives will be lost due to maritime mishaps and 
casualties as response assets are lacking (no Search and Rescue (SAR) assets, SAR 
infrastructure, polar-icebreaking capability). Property and the environment will be also at 
risk due to a lack of oil spill response capability, lack of maritime transportation system 
in the region, and no deep-water port capability. These capabilities and programs exist in 
the other coastal states and territories of the U.S. United States Arctic policy should be 
the catalyst to solve these problems.  
                                                 
3 By law, the Coast Guard has 11 missions: Ports, waterways, and coastal security, Drug interdiction, 
Aids to navigation, Search and rescue, Living marine resources, Marine safety, Defense readiness, Migrant 
interdiction, Marine environmental protection, Ice operations, Other law enforcement. Coast Guard 
mission. http://www.uscg.mil/top/missions/. 
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E. LITERATURE REVIEW  
The literature on U.S. Arctic Policy can be divided into three categories that 
include government publications, scholarly work, and popular media articles and books. 
A review of these categories provides an in-depth review of the current status of 
America’s Arctic Policy and the gaps within, as well as the Arctic policies of the 
remaining seven Arctic nations. Due to the rapidly changing environment in the high 
northern latitudes, the majority of the literature reviewed was published within the past 
few years. Moreover, it seems like there is a new comment or publication on the Arctic 
every day. This makes it difficult to track a “current status” of literature and also 
contributes to confusion regarding U.S. policy and interest. 
Government Publications—Released on 10 May 2013, and unveiled at the 
subsequent Arctic Council meeting in Sweden by Secretary of State John Kerry, “The 
National Strategy for the Arctic Region” attempts to build upon the previously released 
U.S. framework for Arctic policy in the National Security Presidential Directive-66/ 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive (NSPD-66/HSPD-25).4 The strategy objectives 
include advancing American security interests, practicing sustainable Arctic 
administration, and fortifying international cooperation.5  Critics agree, the U.S. plan is 
short on detail and provides tactical direction beyond the desire to accede to UNCLOS.6  
Like NSPD-66/HSPD-25, the latest strategy lacks clear direction and authority to ensure 
necessary U.S. Arctic objectives are met.  
Prior to the release of the 2013 strategy, NSPD-66/ HSPD-25 was the foundation 
of U.S. Arctic policy.7  President George W. Bush signed it in January 2009. NSPD-
66/HSPD-25), and it was designed to meet homeland security and national security needs 
                                                 
4The White House, “The National Strategy for the Arctic Region,” May 10, 2013, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/nat_arctic_strategy.pdf. 
5 Ibid. 
6  Juliet Kayyem,”A Seat at the Arctic Table,” The Boston Globe, May 16, 2103, 
http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2013/05/16/summertime-arctic-and-still-has-effective-strategy-for-
coping-with-melting-seas/w7lnbWsgGxNXDk3xacOuZJ/story.html. 
7 National Security Presidential Directive-66 and Homeland Security Presidential Directive 25 
(January 2009), II.A. http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-66.htm. 
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while strengthening ties among the Arctic nations.8  Security interests named in the 
framework include: missile defense, maritime security, freedom of navigation, strategic 
sealift, and maritime presence. The U.S. must project sea power in order to meet the 
developing missions due to increased human activity as well as ensure lawful sovereign 
claims and rights in the Arctic.9  Because freedom of navigation is a “top national 
priority,” the U.S. must have a strong presence to preserve rights and duties for over 
flight and navigation within the region (Northwest Passage (NWP) and Northern Sea 
Routes (NSR)).10 
In May 2013, the U.S. Coast Guard published the “United States Coast Guard 
Arctic Strategy.”  It is the Coast Guard’s strategic plan for the Arctic for the next 10 
years. The service’s Arctic Strategy is based on three principles including: improving 
awareness of the activities of the maritime domain, modernizing governance, and 
broadening partnerships.11  The publication is glossy and full of color photos and graphs. 
It is a step in the right direction and represents the boldest vision of any U.S. agency in 
the high north. In a total of 47 pages, the document makes an excellent case for the Coast 
Guard’s leadership and executive role in the emerging Arctic, but the lack of support and 
commitment from the Administration and Congress (in the form of a weak budget), and 
service’s plans for merely seasonal operations for the years to come, makes the service 
appear to be a mere “paper tiger” or “paper polar bear” for the foreseeable future. Despite 
its shortcomings, the Coast Guard makes a strong argument to be the lead federal agency 
in the Arctic and is the first agency to provide a theater-strategy plan for the Arctic. 
Another major source of information in support of the U.S. Arctic position is 
congressional testimony. Admiral Thad Allen provided testimony before the 
Subcommittee of the Committee on the Appropriations U.S. Senate for the 111th 
                                                 
8 National Security Presidential Directive and Homeland Security Presidential Directive II.A, 
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-66.htm. 
9 National Security Presidential Directive and Homeland Security Presidential Directive II.B, 
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-66.htm. 
10 National Security Presidential Directive and Homeland Security Presidential Directive III.B 5, 
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-66.htm. 
11 “United States Coast Guard Arctic Strategy,” United States Coast Guard Headquarters, Washington, 
D.C., (May 2013). 
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Congress on August 20, 2009 in Anchorage, AK on this issue.12 Allen was the 30th 
Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard, serving from 2006–2010, and led the federal 
response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and the Deepwater Horizon Spill response in 2010. 
He provided critical homeland security leadership across both Democratic and 
Republican administrations, and as a result, is considered a transformational leader. As a 
leader in homeland security, Congress frequently seeks his insight. In this testimony, 
Admiral Allen discusses the strategic importance of the Arctic to U.S. policy and the 
need for a U.S. presence in the region. 
Numerous government reports on the changing Arctic were written over the past 
few years. The Department of Defense’s Quadrennial Defense Review Report, released in 
February 2010, provides an overarching report on the state of national security and details 
on the latest issues in Arctic policy at they relate to defense issues.13  Later in 2011, the 
Department of Defense Office of the Secretary of Defense Policy submitted a Report to 
Congress on “Arctic Operations and the Northwest Passage.”14  The report is valuable 
because it provides an alternate view from most other government publications. Most 
sources criticize the government for not moving fast enough with respect to the Arctic, 
while this one calls for additional research on the environment before committing 
precious U.S. resources. The drafters of the report are obviously not convinced that the 
Arctic environment is changing from ice to blue water. Critics of DoD might say that, in 
light of not previously committing resources and research to the Arctic, it was engaging 
in “CYA” in this report. Another argument could be that DoD has been stretched very 
thinly over the past 10 years, fighting two wars and has little capacity or funding for this 
mission outside a mandate from the Administration. In contrast to the DoD position in the 
report, the National Strategy for the Arctic Region fully acknowledges climate change in 
the form of diminishing sea ice and the “emergence of a new Arctic environment.”15 
                                                 
12 Admiral Thad Allen, testimony before the Subcommittee of the Committee on the Appropriations 
U.S. Senate. 111th Congress (August 20, 2009, Anchorage AK).   
13 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (February 2010), 19, 62. 
14 Department of Defense, Report to Congress on Arctic Operations and the Northwest Passage, 
Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Policy) (May 2011), 2–4. 
15 The White House, “The National Strategy for the Arctic Region,” May 10, 2013, 2. 
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In January 2012, the General Accounting Office (GAO) published a report on 
“Arctic Capabilities.”16  This report identified gaps in current U.S. policy and the 
growing need to pinpoint capability needs in the Arctic. In the report, GOA lays criticism 
on DoD for not undertaking efforts to ensure the department would be in position to meet 
near-term Arctic capabilities. DoD has gaps in its ability to navigate, communicate, and 
maintain domain awareness in the region. GOA stated the DoD needed to coordinate with 
the Coast Guard to address capability gaps (such as polar icebreaking) and to seek out 
collaborative opportunities in the Arctic.17 
Most recently the Interagency Working Group on Coordination of Domestic 
Energy Development and Permitting in Alaska Report was released in March 2013. The 
report is entitled “Managing for the Future in a Rapidly Changing Arctic: A Report to the 
President.”18 The Chair of the group is David Hayes, the Deputy Secretary of the 
Department of the Interior. This report appears to the most comprehensive report on the 
state of Arctic energy development and permitting to date. As a permitting agency for 
Arctic drilling, the Department of Interior (DOI) has been very critical of Shell Oil 
Company following its 2012 drilling season due to concerns over Shell’s ability to handle 
a mishap while engaged in drilling operations. Unlike the latest national strategy on the 
Arctic, the DOI Report lays out a plan for the Arctic with a sharp focus on energy 
development, which is the catalyst for drawing commercial and government resources 
and assets to the region. 
Award-winning essayist and renowned specialist in naval affairs, Ronald 
O’Rourke, wrote “Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for the Congress 
Congressional Research Service” in June 2012.19  The report tracks the current trends in 
Arctic policy research. The report gives a summary of the latest Arctic issues including: 
                                                 
16 Government Accountability Office, Arctic Capabilities, GAO-12–180 (January 2012). 
17  Ibid. 
18 Department of the Interior, Interagency Working Group on Coordination of Domestic Energy 
Development and Permitting in Alaska, “Managing for the Future in a Rapidly Changing Arctic: A Report 
to the President,” (March 2013). 
19 Ronald O’Rourke, Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress (Congressional 
Research Service, June 15, 2012). 
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loss of Arctic sea ice and the impact on climate change; territorial claims and sovereignty 
issues with respect to the U.S. position on UNCLOS; commercial sea transportation; 
energy exploration; oil spill response; fisheries enforcement; Alaskan natives in the 
Arctic; Coast Guard operations (polar icebreaking and search and rescue); other military 
operations and the geopolitical environment.  
Another seminal document for Arctic policy is the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) concluded in 1982 in Montego Bay, Jamaica. The 
Convention replaced four 1958 treaties. UNCLOS came into force in 1994. To date, 162 
countries and the European Union have signed on to the Convention, including all of the 
Arctic nations (Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Canada, Russia, Iceland, and Finland). The 
U.S. has not ratified UNCLOS, but treats the convention as customary international law. 
Customary international laws are norms that have become widespread enough in the 
international arena through practice and application that individual states do not need to 
consent in order to be bound by them. Some have argued that if it is already custom, there 
is little to gain from accession.  “But custom and practice are far more malleable and 
subject to interpretation.”20  Moreover, the only process for claiming portions of the 
extended Continental Shelf for a nation’s use are through procedures set out in UNCLOS. 
These procedures are too new to be recognized as customary international law. Other 
nations, such as China, could press UNCLOS into vanguard, negative directions, if the 
U.S. does not ratify the treaty and fully participate in this letter and spirit of the treaty. 
UNCLOS is valuable to this research as it is the framework the other seven Arctic nations 
use for legal governance and cooperation. Additionally, UNCLOS contains specific 
dispute resolution mechanisms for maritime boundary lines and resource dispute claims 
for the Arctic through arbitration.21 
Conservative political factions are not in favor of working in cooperation with 
United Nations (parent organization of the International Maritime Organization (IMO)). 
                                                 
20  Stewart Patrick, “(Almost) Everyone Agrees: The U.S. Should Ratify the Law of the Sea Treaty,” 
The Atlantic, June 10, 2012, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/06/-almost-everyone-
agrees-the-us-should-ratify-the-law-of-the-sea-treaty/258301/. 
21 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Annex II. Commission on the limits of the 
Continental Shelf, 1982, http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/annex2.htm. 
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Furthermore, they do not want the United States to subject itself to international tribunals 
have effectively prevented U.S. accession to UNLCOS. But UNCLOS accession is 
supported from all the military service chiefs and the Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs, who 
have traditionally been highly selective with respect to treaties and how they potentially 
affect U.S. service members. For example, they expressed concern over the Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court (ICC) because it was believed to place U.S. personnel 
at risk for trial by an international tribunal. But this is not true for UNCLOS because the 
service chiefs believe UNCLOS will support, rather than thwart, U.S. operations.22  As 
the principal force behind the negotiation of UNCLOS in Montego Bay back in 1982, the 
treaty encompasses everything the U.S. military wants, and is not the “bogey man.” 
Numerous foreign publications form the basis of the literature on the Arctic policy 
of the seven other nations. The specific Arctic plans focus on sovereignty and economic 
development in the nascent Arctic. America’s closest neighbor and partner in the Arctic, 
Canada, released its “Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy: Exercising 
Sovereignty and Promoting Canada’s Northern Strategy Abroad,” in 2012.23  Canada’s 
Office of Foreign Affairs and International Trade drafted the policy. In February 2013, 
Russia, the next closest nation geographically to the U.S. in the Arctic, unveiled its long-
term strategic program for the Arctic. Signed by President Vladimir Putin, the plan is 
entitled, “The Development Strategy of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation.”24  
The remaining five Arctic nations are small in size, but they all have very comprehensive, 
ambitious, and operationally-driven Arctic plans. Released in 2011, Sweden’s “Strategy 
for the Arctic Region” represents that nation’s first Arctic policy.25  The Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs in the Arctic Secretariat drafted the plan. Through its Prime Minister’s 
                                                 
22 Stewart Patrick, “(Almost) Everyone Agrees: The U.S. Should Ratify the Law of the Sea Treaty,” 
The Atlantic, June 10, 2012, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/06/-almost-everyone-
agrees-the-us-should-ratify-the-law-of-the-sea-treaty/258301/. 
23 Government of Canada, “Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy: Exercising Sovereignty and 
Promoting Canada’s Northern Strategy Abroad” Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada (February 
1, 2013). 
24 Russian Federation, “The Development Strategy of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation,” 
(February 20, 2013).  
25 Kingdom of Sweden, “Sweden’s Strategy for the Arctic Region,” Government Offices of Sweden 
(2011), http://www.government.se/content/1/c6/16/78/59/3baa039d.pdf. 
 11 
Office, Finland published its “Strategy for the Arctic Region” in July 2010.26  In 2011, 
Iceland published its Arctic Policy called “A Parliamentary Resolution on Iceland’s 
Arctic Policy.”  It was approved by Althingi, Iceland’s national parliament, at the 139th 
legislative session.27  The Kingdom of Denmark’s “Strategy for the Arctic 2011–2020” 
was released in 2011.28  The Kingdom of Denmark includes Denmark, Greenland, and 
the Faroe Islands. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs for all three nations signed the plan. 
Norway’s “High North” strategy was initially announced in December 2006.29  It was 
updated in 2009 when Norway released the report “New Building Blocks in the North: 
The next step in the Government’s High North Strategy,” which identifies seven priority 
areas.30  The Ministry of Foreign Affairs released both documents. Critics consider 
Norway’s plan “a very practical, results-oriented Arctic strategy” that is advanced 
compared with those of Russia, Canada, and Denmark.31 
Scholarly Sources—Oran Young’s Creating Regimes, Arctic Accords, and 
International Governance, published in 1998 by Cornell University Press provides great 
background on the complexities of international affairs in the region.32  Although the 
book was written fourteen years ago, the models discussed still have application in the 
current geo-political Arctic landscape. The key to successful governance in the Arctic is 
through cooperation and coordination of Arctic states much in the manner the Arctic 
                                                 
26 Republic of Finland, “Finland’s Strategy for the Arctic Region,” Prime Minister’s Office 
Publication (2010), 7, http://formin.finland.fi/public/download.aspx?ID=63216&GUID= 
percent7BC92863F7–1188–4975–9CC8–34EA16C26D07 percent7D. 
27 Republic of Iceland, “A Parliamentary Resolution on Iceland’s Arctic Policy,” (March 28 2011), 
http://www.mfa.is/media/nordurlandaskrifstofa/A-Parliamentary-Resolution-on-ICE-Arctic-Policy-
approved-by-Althingi.pdf. 
28 Governments of Denmark, Greenland and the Faroe Islands, “Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the 
Arctic 2011–2020,” (2011), http://uk.nanoq.gl/~/media/29cf0c2543b344ed901646a228c5bee8.ashx 
29 Kingdom of Norway, “The Norwegian Government’s High North Strategy,” (December 2006), 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Norway (2006),  http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/strategien.pdf. 
30 Kingdom of Norway, “New Building Blocks in the North: The next step in the Government’s High 
North Strategy,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs Norway (2009), 
http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/Nordomr percentC3 
percentA5dene/new_building_blocks_in_the_north.pdf. 
31 Daniel Buikema Fjaertoft, “Norwegian Grand Strategy and the Arctic,” Global Brief (June 27, 
2011), http://globalbrief.ca/blog/2011/06/27/norwegian-grand-strategy-and-the-arctic/. 
32 Oran Young, Creating Regimes Arctic Accords and International Governance (Cornell University 
Press: New York, 1998). 
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Council has developed. Mr. Young is on the faculty of the University of Tromsø in 
Norway and the University of California at Santa Barbara as the Director of the Institute 
of Arctic Studies. 
Numerous scholarly journals have published articles on the state of U.S. Arctic 
policy. These documents are important as they often espouse different aspects of Arctic 
policy from economic and security interests to international cooperation. Charles Ebinger 
and Evie Zambetakis wrote “The Geopolitics of Arctic Melt” for International Affairs in 
2009.33  Ebinger is senior fellow and director of the Energy Security Initiative at 
Brookings. Zambetakis is the Managing Director at Energy Security Research, LLC. The 
authors profess that the thawing Arctic will continue to pose military, economic, and 
environmental challenges to the governance of the region. Furthermore, technology is the 
barrier to entry, but the key to long-term success, in the high north.34 
Jeremy Rabkin of the Competitive Enterprise Institute (CEI) penned “The Law of 
the Sea Treaty: A Bad Deal for America.”35  CEI is a non-profit American think tank 
founded over twenty-five years ago to advance economic liberty and stem the tide of 
over-regulation by the government. Professor Rabkin is an international law scholar and 
was recently confirmed by the U.S. Senate as a member of the Board of Directors of the 
United States Institute of Peace. Rabkin is a Professor of Law at George Mason 
University School of Law. Previously, he was a Professor of Government at Cornell 
University for 27 years. This article is significant as it offers an alternative point of view 
on the subject of UNCLOS and U.S. ratification of the treaty. The author states that 
UNCLOS is not a good deal for the United States and by signing it will surrender 
sovereignty to the IMO, which is run by the United Nations. The review of the literature 
revealed a majority of the authors favored U.S. accession to UNCLOS or the status quo. 
                                                 
33  Charles Ebinger and Evie Zambetakis, “The Geopolitics of Arctic Melt,” (International Affairs 
Vol. 85, June 2009). 
34 Ebinger and Zambetakis, “The Geopolitics of Arctic Melt,” 1217. 
35 Jeremy Rabkin, The Law of the Sea Treaty: A Bad Deal for America (Competitive Enterprise 
Institute, No.3, 2006), 1–2.  http://cei.org/pdf/5352.pdf, http://www.heritage.org/events/2011/09/mike-lee. 
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In 2010, Jamie Kraut and Heather Conley from the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies (CSIS) wrote “U.S. Strategic Interest in the Arctic: An Assessment 
of Current Challenges and New Opportunities for Cooperation.”36  Kraut is currently 
serving as the Director of the Young Professionals in Foreign Policy and was a research 
assistant at CSIS. Kraut is a graduate of the Fletcher School at Tufts. Heather Conley is 
the Senior Fellow and Director of the Europe Program at CSIS. Formerly, Ms. Conley 
served as the deputy assistant secretary of state in the Bureau for European and Eurasian 
Affairs. CSIS is a bipartisan Washington, D.C., based foreign policy think tank. CSIS 
conducts policy studies and strategic analyses on political, economic, and security issues, 
focusing on technology, public policy, international trade and finance, and energy. The 
authors assert that with the race for resources underway in the Arctic, there is potential 
for conflicting territorial claims leading and instability in the region. As a result, the U.S. 
must formulate its strategic interests and develop a “plan of action” to forestall challenges 
and ensure dispute resolution.37 
In late spring 2010, Josh Rogin produced an article in Foreign Policy entitled, 
“Who is in Charge of Arctic Policy?”  Rogin previously wrote on defense and foreign 
policy as a staff writer for Congressional Quarterly.38  He currently writes a web column 
called “The Cable” on national security and foreign policy issues. In this piece, he states 
the Arctic presents a great opportunity as the new frontier of transnational policy 
making.39  Also in 2010, David Titley and Courtney St. John wrote, “Arctic Security 
Considerations and the U.S. Navy’s Roadmap for the Arctic” published in the Naval War 
College Review.40  The Naval War College Review has been in print for over 60 years 
and is a publication dedicated to the discussion of public policy matters of interest to the 
                                                 
36  Heather Conley and Jamie Kraut, “U.S. Strategic Interest in the Arctic An Assessment of Current 
Challenges and New Opportunities for Cooperation,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (April 
2010). 
37 Ibid., 3.  
38 Josh Rogin, “Who is in Charge of Arctic Policy?” Foreign Policy, May 2010, 
http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/05/07/who_s_in_charge_of_arctic_policy. 
39 Ibid. 
40 David Titley and Courtney St. John, “Arctic Security Considerations and the U.S. Navy’s Roadmap 
for the Arctic,” Naval War College Review, Vol. 63, No. 2 (Spring 2010). 
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maritime services (USCG, Navy, and USMC). Rear Admiral Titley is the acting Assistant 
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information Dominance. Previously, he served as 
the Navigator and Oceanographer of the Navy. Courtney St. John is the Associate 
Director for Outreach at the Center for Research on Environmental Decisions (CRED) at 
Columbia University. Formerly, she was the Climate Change Affairs Officer for the 
United States Navy’s Task Force Climate Change. The authors detail the importance of 
the U.S. Navy as a strategic national security tool in the changing Arctic. In “A Coast 
Guard for the Emerging Arctic,” by Coast Guard Captain and Council on Foreign 
Relations Fellow, Peter Troedsson, Captain Troedsson argues the Coast Guard is poised 
to be the agency of action to execute a U.S. Arctic policy. The service’s mission set and 
history provide the experience and authorities to ensure U.S. sovereignty and maritime 
safety and security in the region. He also admits that, due to a bleak budget outlook, this 
can only be accomplished seasonally.41 
Media and Books—The Eskimo and the Oil Man by Bob Reiss is 2012 book 
about the current state of economic affairs in the U.S. Arctic. Reiss has written 18 fiction 
and non-fiction books. He has covered Arctic issues in numerous publications including 
Smithsonian, Outside, Parade, and Politics Daily. Reiss’s book provides a current and 
unique insight into the modern gold rush in the U.S. Arctic from the perspectives of both 
industry and the native people most affected by the shifting environment.42 
There are numerous articles from the popular media at large such as the 
Associated Press, American Forces Press, The Los Angeles Times, and The New York 
Times. The articles largely focus on the current political, economic, and security related 
events in the Arctic and go in to less depth than the more academic articles and reports 
from “think tanks.”  For example, Rear Admiral (RADM) David Gove published “Arctic 
Melt: Reopening the Naval Frontier” for the U.S. Naval Institute’s Proceedings Magazine 
in 2009.43  RADM Gove is now retired and serves as the Director, Undersea Systems at 
                                                 
41  Captain Peter Troedsson, USCG, “A Coast Guard for the Emerging Arctic,” Council on Foreign 
Relations, May 31, 2013, http://www.cfr.org/arctic/coast-guard-emerging-arctic/p30820. 
42 Bob Reiss, The Eskimo and the Oil Man (Business Plus: New York, 2012). 
43 Rear Admiral David Gove, U.S. Navy, “Arctic Melt: Reopening a Naval Frontier,” Proceedings 
Magazine, February 2009, www.usni.org/print/4133. 
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Raytheon Integrated Defense Systems. He previously served as the Oceanographer and 
Navigator of the U.S. Navy. Gove’s article posits that the changing Arctic environment 
provides an opportunity for America’s seas services. The article is helpful in identifying 
and evaluating gaps in the current policy.  
The overall literature provides a wide range of views on current U.S. Arctic 
policy and future of the U.S. operations from the academic, government publications, and 
popular media. The consensus is that the U.S. is behind the power curve due to an 
ineffective U.S. Arctic policy, planning, and lack of clear direction. This is underpinned 
by the lack of UNCLOS accession and a failure to invest in the assets and infrastructure 
required to successfully operate in the region. A bright spot is the collaborative work 
being accomplished through the Arctic Council. 
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II. ASSEMBLING THE EVIDENCE—REVIEW OF CURRENT 
U.S. ARCTIC FRAMEWORK 
A. U.S. HAS AN ARCTIC “WISH LIST” (NOT POLICY)  
The National Strategy for the Arctic Region as mentioned in the literature review 
is the basis for U.S. Arctic policy. It is a framework built generally around the dual goals 
of meeting homeland security and national security needs, while strengthening ties 
among the Arctic nations. The strategy defines specific lines of effort to include 
advancing U.S. security interests, practicing responsible Arctic stewardships, and 
building international cooperation in the region.44  The lines of effort will be guided by 
the following principles; safeguarding peace and stability, making decisions based on the 
best available information, pursuit of innovative arrangements, and consultation with 
Alaska Natives.45 
As with NSPD-66/HSPD-25, the latest U.S. strategy states that the U.S. must 
project sea power in order to meet the developing missions, due to increased human 
activity, as well as to ensure lawful sovereign claims and rights in the Arctic. Because 
freedom of navigation is a top national priority, the U.S. must establish a strong presence 
to preserve rights and duties for overflight and navigation within the region (NWP and 
NSR).46 
The strategy calls upon the Secretaries of Homeland Security, State, and Defense 
to increase capabilities for operating in the region without specific direction, additional 
funding, or authority. The directives support the specific lines of effort called out in the 
strategy. In order to advance security interests the U.S. must enhance Maritime Domain 
Awareness (MDA), preserve Arctic freedom of navigation, “evolve” the current 
infrastructure, and provide for U.S. energy security.47  With respect to the second line of 
effort of pursuing responsible Arctic region stewardship the U.S. must conserve natural 
                                                 
44 The White House, “The National Strategy for the Arctic Region,” May 10, 2013, 2. 
45 Ibid., 2–3. 
46 Ibid., 4. 
47 Ibid., 7. 
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resources and protect the Arctic environment, work in close coordination with the Native 
populations, and accurately chart the Arctic shoreline and waters.48  The third line of 
effort is strengthening international cooperation, which is accomplished through seeking 
opportunities to promote sustainable development, utilizing the Arctic Council to 
advance U.S. accession of UNCLOS, and cooperating with other interested non-Arctic 
and non-state parties to advance common objectives in the Arctic.49 
Although not mentioned in the latest national Arctic policy, PDD-66/NSPD-25 
acknowledged that the geopolitics of the Arctic do not allow for an “Arctic Treaty” akin 
to the Antarctic Treaty.50  There has been some dissent on this issue among some critics 
who believe an “Arctic Treaty” should be signed, and like the Antarctic Treaty, should 
ban military activities and commercial fishing.51  Unlike the Arctic that contains the 
sovereign territory of the eight nations that encompass it, the Antarctic is not owned by 
any single nation. Antarctica is primarily used for scientific research and not the 
sovereign territory of any one nation. An Antarctic-type treaty in the Arctic would require 
the nations signing it to give up significant coastal state’s rights such as economic and 
energy development and would only work if all eight Arctic nations signed-on. This is 
highly unlikely. A criticism of the PDD-66/NSPD-25 was its lack of guidance for 
protecting the unspoiled American Arctic environment, potentially converts the region 
into a military controlled and industrial wasteland.52  In contrast, one of the main 
motivations behind the new national strategy is protection of the Arctic environment and 
ecosystem. 
Critics have stated America’s policy has no plan of action or budgetary plan tied 
to the proposed Arctic initiatives. The Arctic Institute, the nation’s leading “think tank” 
on Arctic issues, has panned the plan, “without a clear budgetary plan, this strategy 
                                                 
48 Ibid., 8. 
49 Ibid., 9–10. 
50 Ibid., .3. 
51 Rick Steiner, “President Obama should reject last-minute Arctic Policy,” Anchorage Daily News, 
January 19, 2009. 
52 Ibid. 
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becomes nothing more than a lengthy wish list…the U.S. Arctic strategy remains as 
elusive [as] a mirage on the Arctic ice sheet.”53  
While the U.S. government delays on an actionable Arctic policy, industry is 
moving forward with U.S. Arctic development. The increased international focus on the 
Arctic requires broader strategic thinking on the part of the U.S. to develop a strategy 
regarding vast natural resources such as fish, timber, hydrocarbons, and other minerals 
that make the Arctic region critical. The opening of the NSR from Asia to the West, and 
the opening of the NWP above Canada, will transform global surface transportation by 
drastically reducing the travel distance between those regions.54   
According to the U.S. Geological Survey, the Arctic has an estimated 90 billion 
barrels of oil, 1,670 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, and 44 billion barrels of natural gas 
liquids, all of which are recoverable.55  As a result, Shell Oil Company commenced 
exploratory drilling in the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in 2012 as the first step 
toward offshore oil production. Over the next few years, British Petroleum (BP) and 
Statoil are planning to commence drilling in U.S. waters.56  The economic impact of U.S. 
Arctic drilling could be significant.57  In order to ensure readiness, but absent a 
comprehensive plan, U.S. agencies such as the Department of Energy (DOE), 
Department of Interior, Coast Guard, and Department of Defense have been scrambling 
to be prepared for the contingencies such development requires including search and 
rescue, oil spill response, and suitable infrastructure.  
                                                 
53 Lara Jakes, “Critics lukewarm on U.S. plans in Arctic,” (Seattle Times, May 13, 2013).  
54 Conley and Kraut, U.S. Strategic Interest in the Arctic An Assessment of Current Challenges and 
New Opportunities for Cooperation, 5. 
55 No author, “90 Billion Barrels of Oil and 1,670 Trillion Cubic Feet of Natural Gas Assessed in the 
Arctic,” USGS Newsroom, July 23, 2008, http://www.usgs.gov/newsroom/article.asp?ID= 
1980&from=rss_home/#.UAHtIHj3Ct8. 
56 Aimee Duffy, “The Coming Boom in Arctic Drilling,” Institute of the North (April 4, 2012), 
http://www.institutenorth.org/assets/images/uploads/articles/The_Coming_Boom_in_Arctic_Drilling_-
_DailyFinance.pdf. 
57 In March 2013, Shell Oil decided to delay future until 2013 following problems with their drill 
ships at the end of the 2012 drilling season and subsequent pending federal investigations both civil and 
criminal. Additionally, Conoco-Phillips, citing the federal administrative hurdles in place also delayed 
drilling through 2014. 
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To adequately address the challenges of the new Arctic frontier, the U.S. needs to 
implement practical fixes such as enhanced Arctic capabilities in the maritime domain 
(search and rescue, communications links, aids to navigation, icebreaking vessels, oil 
spill clean-up), which will help the U.S., prepare for the eventual ice-free Arctic.58 These  
fixes are traditional homeland security missions of the U.S. Coast Guard.59  Although the 
Arctic could be an excellent place to strengthen multi-lateral relationships and enhance 
cooperation in these capabilities, the U.S. currently lacks the strategic vision and budget 
to even improve its own capabilities.60  This lack of vision follows from the failure of the 
U.S. to ratify the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and not 
having a lead agency for Arctic policy development and implementation for the reasons 
that are explored below.  
1. The U.S. is Not a Signatory to the U.N. Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (UNCLOS) 
UNCLOS is the maritime framework the other seven Arctic nations use for legal 
governance and cooperation in the region. One factor that separates the U.S. from other 
Arctic nations is the failure of the U.S. to ratify the treaty. This is evident when 
comparing the latest U.S. strategy to the seven other Arctic nations’ policies. Since the 
remaining seven Arctic nations are all signatories to UNCLOS, it forms the foundation 
for their Arctic policies. In total, 156 nations have signed on to this agreement. that is the 
model for stability and dispute resolution in the maritime domain throughout the world. 
UNCLOS contains specific dispute resolution mechanisms for maritime boundary lines 
 
                                                 
58 Conley and Kraut, “U.S. Strategic Interest in the Arctic An Assessment of Current Challenges and 
New Opportunities for Cooperation,” (The distance from Europe to Asia will be cut by 20  percent since 
vessels will not traverse the Panama Canal), 26. 
59 U.S. Coast Guard missions, http://www.uscg.mil/top/missions/. 
60 Conley and Kraut, “U.S. Strategic Interest in the Arctic An Assessment of Current Challenges and 
New Opportunities for Cooperation,” 26. 
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and resource dispute claims for the Arctic through arbitration.61  Without ratification, the 
U.S. cannot benefit from the assistance and protections membership brings.  
There are a few conservative policy makers who believe UNCLOS is an 
impediment to U.S. sovereignty; they do not support the U.S. joining UNCLOS.62  But 
they are in the minority.63  According to the University of Virginia Center for Oceans 
Law and Policy, the Secretary of Defense, Commandant of the Coast Guard, Chairmen of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff and numerous elected officials support the U.S. joining 
UNCLOS.64  Additionally, every president since Clinton has pushed for ratification, but 
the treaty has not survived the Senate, most recently in 2004.65  The ratification of 
UNCLOS would help the U.S. gain greater influence, sovereignty, and improve strategic 
vision and cooperation in the Arctic region.66  It appears there are a minority of 
influential members of the Senate who do not want the U.S. subject to the jurisdiction of 
an international tribunal (International Law of the Sea Tribunal), which accession would 
require.  
The U.S. currently treats UNCLOS as customary international law, which means 
that where the U.S. can abide by the language of the treaty, it does. In practice, the U.S. 
recognizes the majority of the treaty as binding due to many years of custom, which 
renders most of the treaty as international law and therefore binding on all nations. 
Unfortunately, this does not allow the U.S. to participate in the dispute resolution 
                                                 
61 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,. Annex II, Commission on the limits of the 
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guidelines laid out in the treaty because these are not recognized as customary 
international law. The dispute resolution guidelines are relatively new in the course of 
history, so the only way to benefit from these provisions is to accede to the treaty. As a 
result, current maritime boundary line disputes in the Arctic with Canada must be dealt 
with on a bi-lateral level only and not under the dispute resolution mechanisms 
established under UNCLOS. This is duplicative, wasteful, and lacks predictability of 
eventual resolution. The tools and mechanisms of UNCLOS appear to be a better way to 
deal with dispute resolution as it is seen as the standard method of resolution by all 
signatories. 
The U.S. and Canada have long been in dispute over the waters of the Northwest 
Passage, which Canada claims are internal waters not subject to the conventions of 
“innocent passage” as established under customary international law and UNCLOS, 
while the U.S. regards these waters as an international strait for navigational purposes, 
through which ships can pass without interference by the coastal state (Canada).67  The 
Northwest Passage that crosses over North America would cut shipping routes between 
ports in Asia and U.S. east coast by nearly 5,000 miles.68  Since the U.S. lacks standing 
under the treaty, it is arguing from a position of weakness with respect to the Northwest 
Passage and threat to Freedom of Navigation. 
Furthermore, UNCLOS contains specific provisions for extended Outer 
Continental Shelf (OCS) claims. In the massive land grab for natural resource-rich areas 
that has been going on between the other seven Arctic nations, the U.N., as detailed in 
UNLCOS, is the arbiter. As a non-party, the U.S. is left out in the cold with respect to 
OCS claims. Although the U.S. abides by the rules of UNCLOS without having ratified 
it, it trails behind the remainder of the Arctic states on its policy and in asserting its 
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presence in the region.69  Signing UNCLOS could prove to be an excellent framework 
for shaping U.S. Arctic policy and advancing the current blueprint for the region. As a 
principle participant in the 1982 UNCLOS treaty negotiations, it represents a structure 
that would be beneficial to U.S. security and safety interests. Unfortunately, a minority of 
powerful conservative politicians highjacked the argument. They believe that ITLOS is 
comparable to the ICC (which it is not). Unlike the ICC, the U.S. helped design ITLOS in 
the treaty negotiations.   
Another argument for acceding to the treaty is that as of 2004, UNCLOS 
members have the ability to alter the terms of the treaty.70  As a non-member, the U.S. 
cannot protect its interests or the hard work done by U.S. negotiators in the development 
of the 1982 treaty. The seven other Arctic nations have made UNCLOS a mainstay of 
their respective Arctic strategies. And while not a party to UNCLOS, the U.S. engages 
with the Arctic Council to ensure international cooperation in the region. UNCLOS’s 
importance was summed up well in a May 2013 speech at the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies. Admiral Papp, the Commandant of the Coast Guard, stated, “to 
exercise leadership, improve our ability to influence outcomes, and effectively interact 
with other Arctic Nations, we urgently need the Senate to approve U.S. accession to the 
treaty.”71 
2. The U.S. is an Active Member of the Arctic Council 
The Arctic Council is a high-level intergovernmental forum founded in 1996 that 
addresses issues faced by the eight Arctic governments (Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States) and the indigenous people 
                                                 
69 Charles Ebinger and Evie Zambetkis, “The Geopolitics of Arctic Melt,” International Affairs Vol. 
85 (June 2009): 1223, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2009/11/arctic 
percent20melt percent20ebinger percent20zambetakis/11_arctic_melt_ebinger_zambetakis.pdf. 
70 Citizens for Global Solutions, “The United States and the Law of the Sea,” (undated), 
http://globalsolutions.org/law-justice/law-sea-treaty. 
71 “Unchartered Ice: The U.S. Coast Guard’s New Arctic Strategy,” Speech by Admiral Robert Papp 
given at CSIS (May 21, 2013), http://csis.org/multimedia/video-military-strategy-forum-admiral-robert-j-
papp-jr-commandant-us-coast-guard. 
 24 
within those respective nations.72  The group grew out of the Arctic Environmental 
Protection Strategy.73  NSPD-66/HSPD-25 states that the work of the Arctic Council, 
amongst other bodies, is beneficial to all nations, but should not become a “formal 
international organization.”74  The U.S. position on the status of the Council has evolved. 
The newly released U.S. Arctic strategy states that the U.S. will “continue to emphasize 
the Arctic Council as a forum for facilitating Arctic states’ cooperation on myriad issues 
of mutual interest with its current mandate.”75 
The U.S. delegation on the Council contains a collection of U.S. agencies with 
Arctic responsibilities. Representatives come from DOE, DHS (represented by the Coast 
Guard), and the Department of State, who acts as the lead representative. The Council’s 
main mandates are sustainable development and environmental awareness.76  
In 2008, the Arctic Council signed the Ilulissat Declaration restating that all 
members were committed to UNCLOS and that a new legal regime specific to the Arctic 
was neither needed nor desired. Although the U.S. has not signed on to UNCLOS, it has 
stated affirmatively it is committed to the principles of the treaty and is against any 
expansion of the Council’s mandate.77  Although the mandate has not been expanded, the 
group has accomplished significant multi-lateral progress. Recently in 2011, the Council 
passed the Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR) agreement. The Arctic 
SAR agreement is a noteworthy milestone, since it is the first legally binding agreement 
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signed and conferred under the authority of the Arctic Council.78  On May 15, 2013, the 
group signed an oil spill response agreement for the pristine waters of the Arctic.79    
Despite raising awareness about Arctic issues, the group lacks any regulatory 
authority or the power to address military issues.80  As a result, the Arctic Council is 
limited in overall effectiveness. Due to its limited mandate the council is a conduit for 
cooperation and consensus, rather than an overarching framework for Arctic policy 
between members. But the recent Arctic agreements on SAR and the oil spill response 
are beginning to shift the focus. 
The enhanced international attention on the Arctic requires more expansive 
strategic thinking on the part of the U.S. (beyond the Arctic Council) to develop an 
approach regarding the new Arctic and the opportunities and challenges it presents. 
While the U.S. has been unable to move forward in an organized manner in the Arctic, 
the other Arctic nations have developed strategy, policy, and operational plans.81  
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III. CONSTRUCT THE ALTERNATIVES: THE OTHER 
NATIONS’ ARCTIC STRATEGIES 
The seven other Arctic nations have well-established and explicit plans for action 
in the Arctic. Based on the changing environmental conditions, potential economic 
opportunities, and the chance to establish Arctic sovereignty, the other Arctic nations 
including Canada, Denmark, Norway, Iceland, Sweden, Finland, and Russia have 
developed Arctic policies to ensure their nation’s safety, security, natural resource, 
and sovereignty needs continue to be met in the region.82  All eight nations 
participate in the Arctic Council and advocate for it as a tool for communication and 
cooperation but the Council’s actions are not binding and has yet to be tested or 
challenged by dissent. But the recent addition of the non-Arctic observers will 
challenge the group’s ability to work together on common solutions. 
Additionally, every nation has motivations for its specific policies such as 
sovereignty, expanding international influence, economic growth or security or a 
mixture of all. But, besides the U.S., they all rely upon UNCLOS as the central artery 
for Arctic governance and international cooperation. Nations such as Canada are 
moving ahead with building military bases and a deep-water port in the high latitudes 
of the Arctic.83  According to U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, James Steinberg, the 
Arctic is a test case for of ability of the international community to meet the global 
disputes of the twenty-first century.84  Unfortunately, the U.S. is the last nation to 
establish an Arctic policy and practice. As a result, it trails behind other Arctic 
nations and risks missing the opportunities the Arctic presents.  
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A. CANADA  
According to Prime Minister Stephen Harper, “Canada’s Arctic is central to our 
identity as a northern nation. It is part of our history and it represents the tremendous 
potential of our future.”85  Unlike the U.S., Canada’s Arctic ties are contiguous. Canada 
has taken a dual-track strategy of diplomacy and defense in the Arctic. In August 2010, 
Canada announced a new “Statement of Canada’s Arctic Policy,” which reaffirmed the 
government’s commitment to sovereignty in the Canadian Arctic, to economic and social 
development, to environmental protection, and to protection of indigenous peoples in the 
region. 
The Canadian Arctic Policy is based in the nation’s Northern Strategy first 
introduced in 2007 and further developed in 2009. The four priority areas of the strategy 
are exercising Arctic sovereignty, protecting the nation’s environmental heritage, 
promoting social and economic development, and improving and devolving northern 
governance.86 
In 2012, Canada released its “Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy: 
Exercising Sovereignty and Promoting Canada’s Northern Strategy Abroad.”  The policy 
is firmly based on exercising sovereignty over Canada’s North as the foremost foreign 
policy priority.87   
1. Exercising Arctic Sovereignty 
As an Arctic nation, Canada firmly understands the importance of ensuring and 
maintaining sovereignty over the 162,000 miles of its pristine northern coastline. Canada 
has plans to expand its military presence in the Arctic and to step up efforts to ensure 
sovereignty of claimed waters. The Canada First Defence Strategy contains plans for a 
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$100 million deep-water port in the Arctic, nearly a dozen patrol aircraft, as well as 
additional surveillance capability in order to expand Canada’s maritime domain 
awareness in the region.88 
In May 2010, Canadian and Danish military leaders signed a memorandum of 
understanding on Arctic defense, security, and operational cooperation, committing the 
two countries to consultation, information exchange, visits, and exercises.89   
2. Sovereignty and Increased Military Presence 
Operating in the Arctic is among the six core missions of the Canadian Defence 
Strategy.90  In the summer of 2012, Canadian forces engaged in Operation NANOOK 12. 
It is a joint Royal Canadian Navy (RCN), Canadian Army, and Royal Canadian Air Force 
(RCAF) operation. These forces work alongside federal departments and provincial, 
territorial, regional, and international partners (United States and Denmark), to showcase 
not only Canada’s presence in the Arctic, but demonstrate Canada’s ability to respond to 
emergent situations in the high latitudes.91  The total task force is comprised of over 1250 
personnel at a price tag of over $16 million dollars (CAN).92  The agencies work under 
Canada Command and Joint Task Forth (North). The operation has been conducted 
annually since 2007. The 2012 operation focused on response scenarios: For example, 
one exercise focused on detection and interception of a ship smuggling migrants through 
the Arctic maritime border.93 These operations help Canada build interagency 
coordination and expand maritime domain awareness in the Arctic.  
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Canada’s main method of establishing sovereignty in the Arctic has been through 
the UNCLOS and participation in the Arctic Council. Canada ratified UNCLOS in 
2003.94  Canada is moving ahead with building military bases and a deep-water port in 
the high latitudes of the Arctic.95  According to Canadian Deputy Secretary of State, 
James Steinberg, the Arctic is a test case for the ability of the international community to 
meet the global disputes of the twenty-first century.96  Prime Minister Harper has been an 
advocate for a greater military presence in the Canadian Arctic.  “Canada has a choice 
when it comes to defending our sovereignty over the Arctic; we either use it or lose it,” 
Harper said in July 2007, after he announced the patrol ship program.  “And make no 
mistake—this government intends to use it.”97 
3. Arctic Council  
In May 2013, Canada will assume the Chairmanship of the Arctic Council from 
Sweden through 2015. Canada was the first nation of the Arctic Council’s eight member 
states to hold the Council’s Chairmanship position in 1996. According to Canada’s 
council members “our priorities focus on development for people in the north: 
responsible resource development, safe shipping, and sustainable circumpolar 
communities.”98 
4. International Cooperation 
Canada and the U.S. recently entered into an international agreement to expand 
joint operations in the Arctic. The accord stresses that the Arctic is a place where nations 
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can work together peacefully, and the U.S. and Canadian forces will provide support in 
response to Arctic threats and hazards.99 
The objective is to expand U.S.-Canadian cooperation in the Arctic, chiefly in 
support of safety, security, and defense operations. Areas such as training, capabilities, 
research and development, science and technology, domain awareness, communications, 
and operations will promote a safe and secure Arctic region.100 
5. Protecting the Nation’s Environmental Heritage 
The Arctic is the one of the last frontiers in the world and is comprised of millions 
of square miles of pristine coastline, clean seas, and a healthy ecosystem containing a 
myriad of species of animals and sea life. To combat the effects of global warming on the 
fragile Arctic ecosystem, Canada has taken a proactive approach to protect the 
environment and its inhabitants. For example in July 2010, the Canadian Government 
started requiring that all vessels of a certain size report to the Canadian Coast Guard if 
transiting through the nation’s Arctic waters. Required information includes vessel name, 
position and destination.101  The new regulations will be published in the Northern 
Canada Vessel Traffic Services Zone Regulations. The actions by Canada, as the coastal 
state, are evidence of sovereignty, security and control over their waters. 
6. Promoting Social and Economic Development 
The Canadian Arctic has enormous economic potential in tourism, trade and 
industry. As the ice recedes and the Arctic is transformed, Canada has started 
development of world-class diamond mines and exploitation of enormous oil and gas 
reserves. The unspoiled environment is attracting visitors from around the globe. Ottawa 
has taken action to encourage future economic exploration and development through the 
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improvement of regulatory systems in the Arctic and investing in other critical 
infrastructure to draw citizens, investment, and industry in a sustainable manner.   
7. Indigenous Relations 
Canada, like Alaska, is comprised of many natives or First Nation peoples, thus 
the goal of Arctic development is to have a direct benefit to the native tribes and not 
adversely affect their way of life. Along with the economic development, the government 
is increasing access to vocational education, improved housing conditions, and better 
health care for the inhabitants of the Canadian high latitudes. The aim of the policy is to 
create and sustain a vibrant Arctic economy, with safe, healthy, and prosperous 
communities.102  For example, in 2011 the Canadian government provided funding for 
ecoEnergy, which will help mitigate the effects of climate change for Arctic 
communities. The 20 million dollars in funding will provide feasibility studies of 
renewable energy projects in addition to the design and construction of energy ventures 
incorporated within community buildings.103 
8. Improving and Devolving Northern Governance 
Canada functions as a federation where the provincial governments and the 
federal government have separate jurisdictions of political authority.104  Canada is also a 
democratic constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary type of government where the 
“Crown” is the basis of the judicial, legislative, and executive branches of 
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government.105  “Devolution” is the transfer of province-like responsibilities from the 
Canadian federal government to the territories. Recently, territorial governments of the 
high latitudes have taken on greater responsibility for education, health care, and social 
services in their respective regions. One notable exception to the devolution was federal 
control over lands and resource management.106  In April 2003, the Yukon Territory 
signed a devolution agreement on lands and resource management with Ottawa. The 
Northwest Territories is progressing towards a similar agreement.107  
Another area of focus is self-government and land claims. Currently, 11 of 14 
Yukon First Nations have signed self-government agreements and settled claims. The 
majority of Northwest Territories is covered by the Comprehensive Land Claims 
Agreements that give native people authority to manage both their lands and 
resources.108  The Self- Government Agreements are legal instruments unique to Canada. 
The agreements call for First Nation governments to govern themselves, their citizens, 
and their land. The powers include land and resource management as well as local bylaws 
and zoning.109 
The Nunavut Land Claims Agreement led to the creation of Canada’s newest 
territory in 1999, providing Inuit of the Eastern Arctic with some 1.9 million square 
kilometers (20 percent of Canada) in the largest Aboriginal land claim settlement in 
Canadian history.110  Similar progress has been made on agreements in other Arctic 
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people such as the Inuit living in Labrador and in the Nunavik region of Northern 
Quebec. The Labrador Inuit Land Claims Agreement contains defined rights in and to 
territory in northern Labrador. The Inuit of Nunavik Agreement in Principle, signed in 
August 2007, calls for the creation of a new form of public regional government tailored 
to the needs of the Nunavik people. The Nunavik Inuit Land Claim Agreement received 
Royal Assent in February 2008.111 
9. Summary and Analysis 
Canada has had an evolving Arctic Strategy for many years. In recent years the 
focus has changed as former areas of perennial ice have become seasonal, and vessels 
have begun to ply the North West Passage more frequently. Canada’s detailed Arctic 
strategy contains four priority areas including Arctic sovereignty, protecting the nation’s 
environmental heritage, promoting social and economic development, and improving and 
devolving Northern governance. Canada has been a strong advocate of the UNCLOS 
treaty and the Arctic Council to build consensus and ensure fair dealing with both her 
neighbors as well as the First Nations Peoples living above the Arctic Circle. Canada has 
traditionally had military units, vessels and aircraft stationed in the Arctic but their 
strategy calls for that to grow to ensure safety, security, and awareness in the region. The 
Northwest Passage, like the Northern Sea Route in Russia, provides Canada an 
opportunity to build global clout and influence while bolstering the economy of the 
frozen north. Canada is building and improving her Arctic infrastructure as well and 
improving the lives of the native inhabitants, which is a lesson the U.S. should apply to 
its Arctic policy because the U.S. has less infrastructure in the Arctic than Canada.  
B. RUSSIAN FEDERATION 
Russia has been the most active country in the Arctic. This may be due to the fact 
that Russia has the greatest territorial interest in the region with over 4,000 miles of 
Arctic coastline. Although most of the Russian Arctic is currently undeveloped, Russia 
sees great security and economic opportunity in the region. Unlike the other Arctic 
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nations that have been developing a specific Arctic policy, to the Russian Federation the 
Arctic is Russia’s policy.   
In February 2013, Russian unveiled its long-term strategic program for the Arctic. 
Signed by President Vladimir Putin, the plan includes development of an integrated 
transport system in the Arctic, establishment of a research and development center and 
technological sector, enhanced international cooperation, and the preservation of the 
Arctic as a zone of peace.112 
The new Arctic policy is very broad ranging and encompasses almost every 
aspect of Arctic issues. Specifically, it guarantees federal assistance for infrastructure 
development in transportation, commercial industry, and the energy sector. During the 
first stage (2013–2015) of the policy implementation, the Russian Federation intends to 
concentrate on communications and information infrastructure development in the Arctic, 
launching search and rescue stations along the Northern Sea Route, expansion of the 
Coast Guard, and development of a fully integrated nation-wide program for 
environmental monitoring of the Russian Arctic.113 
1. Military Presence to Promote Security  
In March 2009, the Russian Federation announced plans to establish a military 
force to protect its Arctic interests, due to the growing strategic importance of the Arctic 
region.114  The National Security Strategy calls for increased border and defense security 
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in the Arctic.115  Like her Arctic partners, Russia plans to increase infrastructure and 
deep-water ports while developing even greater icebreaking capability.116 
2. UNCLOS 
Like the other Arctic nations, except the U.S., Russia is a signatory to UNLOS. 
The USSR became a signatory in 1982; UNCLOS was later ratified in 1997 by the 
Russian Federation.117  Russia has utilized the provisions of UNCLOS to advance 
sovereignty, especially along the Northern Sea trade route, which passes through Russia’s 
northern Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Russia is using UNCLOS provisions in an 
attempt to exercise control over the Northern Sea route by requiring vessels to seek 
permits and submit their vessels to inspection due to the ice conditions. This is 
considered an overreach of authority by the U.S., which is protesting the plans.118  As a 
non-party to UNCLOS, the U.S. cannot utilize the established means of the treaty to 
protest. 
3. Arctic Council 
Russia has also been an active and, at times, controversial member of the Arctic 
Council. In 2012, Russia suspended their indigenous group assigned to work with the 
Council.119  Besides the eight member nations, there are six aboriginal groups that 
represent 250,000 native inhabitants of the Arctic across the region. These groups are not 
allowed to vote on Council matters, but are consulted on activities and participate in the 
meetings. The suspension likely reflects a deep division between the Russian delegation 
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and its aboriginal group about how to manage Arctic issues. It is the first time in the 
Council’s history that a party has been shut out of the proceedings.120 
4. Economic and Natural Resource Development 
Russia is keenly interested in the rich natural resources, such as oil and gas, in the 
Arctic that may lie well beyond the traditional limits of the Exclusive Economic Zone 
(EEZ). Russia is actively engaged in numerous studies to support the nation’s claim for 
an extended continental shelf to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental 
Shelf. A previous claim was rejected in 2001.   
According to the 2009 National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation, 
Russian prosperity and global competitiveness are dependent upon the wealth of 
resources in the Arctic. The report estimates that 20 percent of the nation’s gross 
domestic product and 20 percent of exports come from the Russian Arctic.121 
Like Canada’s claim to the NWP, Russia claims that the NSR, which runs along 
the nation’s entire northern border, is within the country’s jurisdiction and subject to its 
national laws.122  The NSR is a potential major shipping route as it may significantly 
reduce shipping times and distance from Asia to Europe. Control of the route would 
expand Russia’s strategic importance in the world.  
Due to the large amount of Arctic coastline, natural resources, and economic 
opportunities, there is little doubt Russia will continue to focus on the Arctic.  “For 
Russia, it is difficult to exaggerate the potential geopolitical and geo-economics 
importance of the Arctic.”123 
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5. Summary and Analysis 
Russia’s motivations in the Arctic are the potential economic benefit of untapped 
energy resources of the extended continental shelf, and the ability to exert influence and 
control over the now navigable NSR. As the largest nation in the Arctic, the opening of 
the region will increase Russia’s sphere of influence outside of the Arctic. Russia’s 
treatment of its aboriginal Arctic people is unfortunate and a lesson on how not to 
coordinate and partner on the world stage. Unlike the U.S., Russia is forward leaning on 
Arctic issues and has been aggressively placing resources in the Arctic, including military 
personnel, ships, and to ensure sovereignty and control in meeting their Arctic objectives.   
C. KINGDOM OF DENMARK 
Denmark has taken a multi-track approach to Arctic policy. The rapidly changing 
natural environment drove the policy. The Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 
2011–2020 is based on four principals: development that benefits inhabitants of the 
Arctic, responsible decision-making regarding use of resources and environmental 
protection, security, and international cooperation.124  The Kingdom of Denmark 
includes Denmark, Greenland, and the Faroe Islands. The plan calls for increased 
scientific research, expanded military presence in Greenland, economic development, and 
support of the use of UNCLOS as the legal framework in the Arctic.   
In 2008, the Danes hosted an Arctic conference to advance the idea of sustainable 
Arctic development and climate change.125  The “greening” of the Arctic will lead to 
greater economic opportunities in Greenland. For example, the Danes would look to 
develop the vast precious metals and petroleum resources available in Greenland. This 
will lead to increased jobs and infrastructure development.126 
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1. Sovereignty and Security 
One of the main priorities in the Dane’s Arctic Plan is to ensure a safe, secure, 
and peaceful Arctic through the exercise of sovereignty, surveillance, and maritime 
safety. To reach this goal, the Danes are planning to expand their military presence in the 
region. The Armed Forces North Atlantic command will change, and the Greenland 
Command and the Faroe Command will be merged into a joint service Arctic 
Command.127  This will allow for better command and control over security and defense 
forces in the Arctic.  
The Danish Defence Agreement 2010–2014 contains specific provisions on 
Greenland and the Arctic. The agreement calls for the creation of an Arctic Response 
Force to meet to ever growing security needs in the region.128  The Arctic Response 
Force will undertake a variety of missions mainly geared at upholding sovereignty and 
arctic domain awareness.129 
Denmark is planning a $117 million military upgrade to facilities on Greenland to 
build surveillance and sovereignty through increased maritime air domain awareness.130  
The plan also calls for a study of maritime traffic in the area around Greenland to ensure 
safety of the maritime environment.131  With the increase in marine traffic in the Arctic, 
the risk of ship collisions, oil spills, and stranded vessels and mariners requiring search 
and rescue assistance, will increase as well. The Danes are planning a 2014 
comprehensive review of armed forces to look for opportunities for military cooperation 
with the other Arctic nations.132  
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2. Respectful Development of Resources and Environmental Protection 
The Kingdom of Denmark sees the thawing of the Arctic as an opportunity to 
exploit the vast natural resources in the sea, on the land, and in the land. Greenland 
contains a substantial amount of mineral and oil/gas deposits. The plan outlines 
Denmark’s intention to develop the natural resources, while ensuring compliance with the 
“best international practices” and under the highest standards of safety health, 
environment and transparency.133  
Exploitation will be conducted with a firm understanding of the fragile and 
changing environment of the Arctic. Development should contribute to economic 
development including jobs for residents of the region. Denmark has experienced a 
growth in Arctic renewable energy as well. Through the development and expansion of 
hydroelectric power systems, Denmark plans to have 30 percent of all electricity 
production from renewable sources by 2020.134  Denmark has been at the vanguard of the 
global climate change discussion and the effect on the environment. The government is 
closely studying the planned activities and endeavors to watch for changes to animal and 
plant habitats and migration routes. 
3. International Cooperation (UNCLOS and the Arctic Council) 
Denmark’s vision for the future of the Arctic is based on ensuring peaceful 
cooperation between Arctic and non-Arctic nations to ensure proper exploitation of 
resources with within established international forums. Denmark’s main method of 
establishing sovereignty in the Arctic has been through UNCLOS and participation in the 
Arctic Council. Denmark ratified UNCLOS in 2004.135  UNCLOS is the framework for 
both coastal states and flag states for navigation, development and exploitation of 
resources and conflict resolution. 
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Denmark has been an active and vocal participant on the Arctic Council, and it is 
a principle objective of the kingdom to build cooperation within the group. Denmark was 
instrumental in the development of the Arctic Search and Rescue (SAR) agreement for 
the Arctic.136  Denmark served as the chair of the Council from 2009–2011. During its 
tenure, Denmark hosted a Foreign Ministers meeting in 2011 where the Nuuk Declaration 
was adopted. The Nuuk Declaration set out the role and criteria for Council observers, 
established the permanent secretariat in Norway, and established a task force to deal with 
Arctic oil spills.  
In 2010, Denmark strongly advocated for the Council to allow for greater 
observer status for non-Council members. The Danes argued the changing Arctic affects 
more than the eight nations that ring the North Pole, and as a result “giving other nations 
some kind of formal observer status on the Arctic Council may be the best way to ensure 
its continuing influence—allowing other countries inside the tent may be the best way to 
keep it standing.”137  Due to the mineral riches contained in Greenland, China has been 
lobbying Denmark very hard for assistance in getting permanent observer status on the 
Council. 
4. Summary and Analysis 
The Kingdom of Denmark has a comprehensive Arctic policy that includes a 
greater sovereignty with an expanded military presence in Greenland, more scientific 
research to manage the rapidly changing environment, economic development of oil/gas 
and minerals, and support of the use of UNCLOS as the legal framework in the Arctic. 
Denmark’s Arctic policy is focused on mineral exploration to build economic growth in a 
sustainable manner. Greenland’s vast array of mineral deposits has been the focus of the 
developing world, especially China, who is looking to meet demand in rare earth metals. 
This has driven Denmark to favor opening up the Arctic Council to other nations. As with 
the rest of the Arctic nations, Denmark believes in the strength of the Arctic Council to 
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reach collaborative solution to Arctic problems such as search and rescue and oil spill 
response. Unlike her cousin Iceland, Denmark is planning for a massive Arctic military 
build-up to ensure both MDA and sovereignty in the region. The U.S. should emulate 
Denmark’s military build-up in the Arctic to ensure maritime safety and security.    
D. NORWAY 
In Norway, development in the Arctic has been the government’s most important 
foreign policy priority. Norway’s High North strategy was initially announced in 
December 2006.138 Critics consider Norway’s plan “a very practical, results-oriented 
Arctic strategy” that is advanced as compared with Russia, Canada, Denmark, and the 
U.S.139 
Norway has been on the forefront of Arctic policy development through a balance 
of diplomatic and military efforts. Unveiled in 2006, the High North Strategy is 
Norway’s comprehensive geopolitical and regional policy. Norway’s policy lies in the 
vast economic resources (oil and gas), fisheries, environmental governance, and military 
upgrades.140  Norway understands that sustainability of natural resources, such as 
fisheries, can only be done through close coordination. As a result, a focus of the plan is 
cooperation and communication with Norway’s neighbor to the east, and former Cold 
War foe, the Russian Federation.141 
Norway is also shifting military forces to the Arctic in a sign of security and 
sovereignty over the region. The Norwegian joint operational headquarters and Army 
staff headquarters were moved above the Arctic Circle. New frigates and jets were also 
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transferred up to the Arctic town of Bardufoss from the political capital of Oslo.142  
Changes such as these exhibit the importance Norway is placing on the region for the 
future of the country. 
On March 12, 2009, Norway released the report “New Building Blocks in the 
North,” which identifies seven priority areas: climate and the environment, monitoring-
emergency response-maritime safety in northern waters, sustainable development of 
offshore petroleum and renewable marine resources, economic development, 
infrastructure, sovereignty and cross-border cooperation, and the welfare of indigenous 
peoples in the Arctic.143 
As sign of Norway’s commitment to the Arctic region, the 2011 central 
government budget called for a total of NOK 1.2 billion to be set aside for projects in the 
High North, a significant portion of which was earmarked for research.144  The priorities 
are initiatives in the areas of health, the environment, education, and research. 
1. UNCLOS and International Cooperation 
On the international front, Norway is a signatory to UNCLOS and ratified the 
treaty in 1996. Norway treats UNCLOS as the blueprint for international and domestic 
Arctic governance and management. The Norwegian Arctic is teeming with oil and gas, 
and the government is utilizing UNCLOS as the method of securing the nation’s stake. 
Norway’s UNCLOS claims from 2009 have been roundly supported internationally. 
Norway’s Statoil (the country’s semi-national oil company), France’s Total, and Russia’s 
Gazprom, are working on a joint development project in the Arctic. Additionally, 
Norway and Russia brought finality to their 40-year-old Arctic maritime border 
dispute.145 
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2. Role of the Arctic Counsel in Norway 
Norway has also been a very active member of the Arctic Council. Norway served 
as secretariat of the council from 2007–2013. Most recently, Norway pushed for 
inclusion of China into the council as an observer. China would join Italy, Japan, Korea, 
Singapore, India, and the European Union (EU) who are all seeking official observer 
status as well. According to Norway’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, Espen Barth Aide, 
“We want people to join our club. That means they will not start another club.”146  
Norway has emphasized the important role of the Arctic Council; and by expanding the 
tent, the Council not only remains relevant, but also is the forum for all Arctic issues. 
3. Summary and Analysis 
Norway’s Arctic Strategy is a well-developed plan of action, which could be a 
lesson for U.S. policy makers. Unlike the U.S., Norway has always identified strongly 
with the Arctic and is dedicating resources and funding for Arctic projects. In order to 
build influence in the region, Norway has pushed to expand the Arctic Council to other 
nations. Through UNCLOS’ dispute resolution mechanism, Norway has been working to 
settle maritime border disputes with her neighbors in a manner that would likely not be 
possible in simply bi-lateral talks. Norway’s contemporary Arctic strategy is focused on 
cooperation with Arctic neighbors, not competition. This will be critical for ensuring 
sustainable natural resource management, security, and for upholding UNCLOS as a 
framework for Arctic governance.  
E. SWEDEN  
Released in 2011, Sweden’s Arctic policy represents the first policy the nation has 
adopted for the region and is based on four priorities. They include: a better 
understanding of the effects of climate and the Arctic environment, capitalization of 
economic opportunities, development in the region, and the protection of indigenous 
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people of the Arctic.147  International cooperation (UN, EU, and Arctic Council) and 
bilateral channels are avenues to achieve Arctic governance. 
1. International Cooperation 
Sweden has an important role to play in both multilateral and bilateral 
discussions. The strategy is based on the understanding that climate change creates both 
new challenges and opportunities in the far north. Sweden is promoting economically, 
socially, and environmentally sustainable development in the Arctic region while their 
security policy is anchored in mutual assistance and avoiding conflict.148 
Sweden was the chair of the Arctic Council from 2011 until 2013. Sweden is 
currently chairing the Arctic Council’s Sustainable Development Working Group and the 
Eco-System Based Management Working Group.149  Sweden’s goal is to strengthen the 
Arctic Council both “institutionally and politically.”150  
2. Indigenous People 
Sami are the indigenous people of the Swedish Arctic. Twenty thousand Sami 
currently live in Sweden. Sweden endeavors to ensure Sami people have an opportunity 
to preserve and develop their identity, culture, and traditional way of living.151  As a 
result, Sweden ensures active participation by indigenous people in the decision-making 
process and future plans for the Arctic. 
3. Climate Monitoring  
An extensive environmental monitoring study on Arctic temperature, 
meteorology, ice-thaw, plants, and animal life has been in progress in the Swedish Arctic 
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for almost 100 years. Sweden’s north houses research stations in Abisko and Tarfala as 
well as the EISCAT12 scatter radar facility in Kiruna. These sites draw scientists and 
researchers from around the globe.152  
4. Marine Transportation 
Sweden possesses leading expertise in shipping in Arctic conditions. Sweden has 
long understood that efficient ice-breaking operations are required to promote maritime 
safety, maritime domain awareness, and improve accessibility for research and 
commerce. Swedish icebreakers are able to support increasing commercial shipping in 
the Arctic as well as help with both the monitoring of the vulnerable marine environment 
and Arctic research. The Swedish Maritime Administration’s Polar Research Secretariat 
gives Sweden plenty of scope to perform marine research expeditions in the Arctic with 
the icebreaker Oden. 
5. Summary and Analysis 
Sweden is approaching Arctic governance through a variety of forums: UN 
(through UNCLOS), EU, and the Arctic Council. Traditional skills and competencies in 
polar icebreaking put Sweden in position to ensure MDA and advance economic 
development in the region. Swedish climate monitoring will help the rest the Arctic and 
the world better understand the dynamic conditions underway in the region. Sweden’s 
Arctic strategy provides specific goals the nation is looking to achieve in the region as 
lesson the U.S. can take apply to its Arctic planning. 
F. FINLAND 
Finland published its Strategy for the Arctic region in July 2010. The strategy 
details the region’s security, environment, economy, infrastructure, indigenous people, 
and international institutions. The goal of the policy is to provide further research, 
bolstering of the Arctic Council, and advancement of the European Union’s (EU) Arctic 
policy. 
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The Strategy highlights the importance of international relations in ensuring long-
lasting peace, security, and development of the Arctic.153  The policy is broken out into 
six principal areas: climate, economic activities, transport/infrastructure, indigenous 
peoples, regional/international cooperation, and EU objectives. 
1. Environment and Climate 
Finland understands the importance of climate change in the Arctic. The natural 
resources that are now available due to receding ice must be mined, drilled, and harvested 
via sustainable means and methods if they are to be used in an environmentally 
sustainable way.154  Finland supports measures that assist Arctic peoples in adapting their 
lifestyles to the changing environment. For example, the changing climate will affect 
reindeer herds and those who depend on the animals for sustenance.155  Finland is 
conducting studies to assist the native herders. 
2. Economic Activities 
Like her Arctic neighbors, Finland plans to utilize the opportunity of a changing 
Arctic for research, development, and education. The nation plans to capitalize on 
Finnish expertise in marine transportation and ship manufacturing to spur economic 
activity. Finland is working with Russia to develop oil and gas in the Arctic region. In 
2009, Finland opened one of Europe’s largest gold mines. Tourism is also expected to 
grow in the Murmansk region as well as in Lapland and Oulu.156  Finland is putting plans 
in place to profit economically from the receding ice. 
3. Transport/Infrastructure 
Finland plans to further develop transportation, communications, and logistics 
hubs across the Arctic and between her Arctic neighbors. Working through the IMO, 
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Finland is striving to create better standards for Arctic shipping to ensure the safety of 
seafarers, vessels, and the environment of the north.157  Shore-side, Finland wants to 
create better connections and access between villages, towns, and ports. The Finns would 
also like to develop cross-border connections with the Russian Federation to include air 
and seaport hubs.158  
Finland regards UNCLOS as the means to coordinate future Arctic shipping. In 
order to combat a potential oil spill, or undertake a mass search and rescue case, Finland 
has properly equipped and prepared its Border Guard to respond in the Arctic.159  Their 
presence may mitigate maritime accidents and speed oil spill response. A key tool in 
prevention of marine accidents and response capability is the use of surveillance 
systems—both domestically and through international agreements—to ensure the safety 
of the Arctic marine transportation system. 
4. Treatment of Indigenous People of the Arctic 
The Sami are the only indigenous people of Europe, and nearly 10,000 live in 
Finland. Finland recognizes the inherent right of the Sami to participate in Arctic 
decision-making, including participation on the Arctic Council. Sami culture and 
language are protected under the nation’s constitution.160  Finland’s objective is to 
improve the living conditions of the Sami people through sustainable development of the 
Arctic region.161 
5. Regional and International Cooperation 
Although Finland is a landlocked Arctic nation, it has been a very vocal supporter 
of utilizing UNCLOS to resolve all claims concerning the continental shelf and the deep 
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seabed.162  Additionally, Finland opposes obstructions to maritime traffic, such as the 
intention of the Russian Federation to charge transport fees for vessels utilizing the 
northern sea routes. Rather, Finland wants any fees collected to support marine safety in 
the Arctic.163 
6. Arctic Council 
Finland believes strongly in the Arctic Council and wants to continue the 
momentum created by the work of the group. Finland was a pioneer in Arctic 
coordination and protection of the environment. Finland engaged in multilateral Arctic 
cooperation in the 1960s along with other Nordic countries in the North Calotte 
cooperation.164  The work led to the establishment of the Barents Euro-Arctic Council in 
1993, which also included the Russian Federation and the newly formed European 
Union.165 
Following the fall of the Soviet Union, Finland organized meetings between the 
eight Arctic nations. Later, Finland spearheaded the Ministerial Conference in Rovaniemi 
in 1991. The conference was a landmark event as it was the first ministerial meeting of 
the eight Arctic countries.166  Finland was integral in the 1993 founding of the Arctic 
Council and remains a key player today. Most recently, Finland has exhibited support for 
the European Union application for admittance as a permanent observer member of the 
Arctic Council.167 
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7. Summary and Analysis 
Finland has been a leader in building international cooperation and coordination 
in the Arctic, long before the U.S. began considering the strategic importance of the 
region. A large component of Finland’s strategy is the significance of UNCLOS in the 
future vitality of the Arctic. This is lesson for U.S. policy makers. As a supporter and 
signatory of UNCLOS, Finland has been a proponent of the dispute resolution 
mechanisms of the treaty. Additionally, Finland is using the EU as a forum to better raise 
awareness of Arctic issues amongst fellow EU nations.    
G. ICELAND 
Driven by a changing Arctic environment, Iceland published its Arctic Policy in 
2011. The main policy objectives include strengthening the Arctic Council; ensuring 
Iceland’s status as an Arctic coastal state; promoting UNCLOS as the mechanism for 
Arctic governance; support to the indigenous peoples of the Arctic; international 
cooperation in the Arctic; and promotion of trade between Arctic nations.168 
1. UNCLOS 
Iceland ratified UNCLOS in 1985, and the treaty forms a main pillar of the 
nation’s Arctic Policy.169  Under the policy, Iceland reaffirms that UNCLOS creates the 
basis for the settlement of potential disputes over jurisdiction and natural resource rights 
in the Arctic. UNCLOS provides the legal framework on navigation, fisheries, and 
exploitation of natural resources along the continental shelf, maritime demarcation, spill 
prevention, scientific research, and dispute resolution.  
Within UNCLOS, the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) 
has the function of considering applications by coastal states concerning the outer limits 
of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, and to make recommendations 
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associated to those limits. Iceland believes a lasting commitment to the 200-nautical mile 
EEZ is a requirement for continued peace and cooperation in the region170. 
2. Arctic Council 
Iceland is an active member of the Arctic Council and sees the group’s role as 
critical in shaping cooperative efforts in the region. In January of 2013, the Arctic 
Council’s permanent secretariat was established. The creation of the permanent 
secretariat was a priority in Iceland’s Arctic policy.171  Like most other Arctic nations, 
Iceland wants to enhance the power of the Arctic Council as the premier body of 
influence in the region. Additionally, Iceland applied for EU membership in 2009, which 
would enlarge the EU’s footprint in the Arctic.  
3. Upholding Security Interests 
Iceland promotes security in the Arctic through civilian governance methods and 
does not support militarization of the Arctic. This is in contrast to some other Arctic 
nations, namely Russia and Canada, who have actively moved military and security 
forces, assets, and infrastructure to the Arctic as a sign of sovereignty. Iceland’s 
cooperation with other States is based on the protection of the environment, scientific 
research, search and rescue, as well as pollution prevention in the Arctic region.172 
4. Indigenous People 
Iceland, like most other Arctic nations, supports the rights of indigenous peoples. 
According to Iceland, native groups have the right to be consulted on all political, social, 
cultural, economic, or environmental interests affecting their villages. Indigenous groups 
must be afforded the opportunity to nurture their cultural individuality, enhance their 
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communities, and improve their standard of living. Iceland promotes the use of the Arctic 
Council and other international conventions as a means of including indigenous people, 
as permanent members, in determining the future of Arctic policy and implementation.173  
Recently, Iceland objected to the exclusion of indigenous groups from the meetings 
between the five coastal States in Ilulissat, Greenland and Chelsea, Canada.174 
5. Summary and Analysis 
Like her European Arctic neighbors, Iceland has a detailed and focused policy for 
the Arctic. The policy aims at bolstering the Arctic Council, reinforcing the use of 
UNCLOS as the method for Arctic governance, assisting Arctic natives, and developing 
the economy through trade. In stark contact to the other Arctic nations, Iceland does not 
want to use the military as means of control or sovereignty in the region but is working 
through international cooperation to achieve their Arctic strategy goals. 
H. NON-ARCTIC STATES  
Most recently, Norway pushed for inclusion of China into the council as an 
observer. China would join Italy, Japan, Korea, Singapore, India, and the EU who are all 
seeking official observer status as well. According to Norway’s Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, Espen Barth Aide, “We want people to join our club. That means they will not 
start another club.”175  Norway has emphasized the important role of the Arctic Council 
and by expanding the tent; the Council not only remains relevant but also is the forum for 
all Arctic issues. At their biennial meeting on May 15th in the Swedish city of Kiruna, its 
foreign ministers agreed that China, India, Italy, Japan, South Korea and Singapore could 
become permanent observers, joining 26 current ones. But they denied that status to all 
international groups that applied, including non-governmental organizations (NGO) such 
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as Greenpeace. The EU’s admittance was postponed, pending talks with Canada.176  
Many of the new members have been active in the Arctic for many years. For example, 
since 1999, China has led five Arctic marine expeditions, including one in 2012. Japan 
and South Korea built powerful icebreaking vessel, which allow them to conduct their 
own exploratory operations and support those by other states and organizations.177   
Immediately following announcement, the Polar Research Institute of China said 
it plans to establish a China-Nordic Arctic Research Center in Shanghai to increase 
awareness and knowledge of the Arctic and promote cooperation for its sustainable 
development. 178 “The Arctic is a region where frequent economic activities are taking 
place,” Yang Huigen, head of the Polar Research Institute of China.179  There has been 
speculation that China’s interest is based on the Arctic’s abundant natural resources. “But 
we insist that those recourses are not ours, and China’s partnership with Arctic countries 
in the sector will come naturally as it is part of the widening economic cooperation 
among countries under the context of globalization.” 180 Other nations such as India 
claimed that its approach to the Arctic is exclusively scientific. “Unlike China and South 
Korea, which are going for commercial benefit, our interest is purely scientific,” stated a 
Indian official.181  
Sweden’s foreign minister, Carl Bildt, said the addition of the observers 
strengthened the council by recognizing the pre-eminence of the permanent nations’ 
sovereignty in the Arctic. In doing so Mr. Bildt reinforced the in-group/out-group 
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dynamic of the Arctic Council. Instead of welcoming the new observers, he pointed out 
the differences. “I would say it demonstrates the broad international acceptance of the 
role of the Arctic Council, because by being observer, these organizations and states, they 
accept the principles and the sovereignty of the Arctic Council on Arctic issues,” Bildt 
said when asked if adding participants threatened to dilute the council’s value. “As a 
matter of fact, it strengthens the position of the Arctic Council on the global scene.”182  
The council’s final declaration following the acceptance of the new members 
recognized “the central role of business in the development of the Arctic,” though it 
called for development to be conducted in ways that would sustain indigenous peoples 
and the environment.183 Most of the new members were already observers on an ad hoc 
basis prior to formal admission. Their authority will continue to be pretty limited: they 
cannot speak or vote. But with their new expertise and money, they could influence 
decisions in the council’s various working groups in the years to come.  
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IV. SELECT THE CRITERIA—WHAT ARE THE GAPS IN THE 
CURRENT FRAMEWORK WHEN COMPARED WITH 
ALTERNATIVES?   
Unlike the more concrete plans of the other Arctic nations, the National Strategy 
for the Arctic Region is a collection of ideas that attempt to advance U.S. interests in the 
Arctic, but it lacks clear direction, authority, and funding to implement measures that 
belong in a comprehensive strategic policy. Because only one of the United States’ 50 
states qualifies the U.S. as an Arctic nation, most Americans do not identify with the 
region. The Arctic is not on the forefront of the American political stage. Due its relative 
remoteness from the other states, its unique climate, and geopolitical challenge, it is a low 
priority in national discussions. Only Alaska qualifies the U.S. as an Arctic nation, and 
only a portion of this large, but sparsely populated state, qualifies the U.S. as such. An 
Arctic policy requires a clear mission statement from the U.S. government to the 
American people and the rest of the world stating that “the U.S. is an Arctic Nation,” and 
UNCLOS is the legal framework for action in the region. 
Beyond that, the policy needs to explain the U.S. strategic interests in the region. 
For example, a melting Arctic will open sea lanes and maritime commerce, and this will 
mean that the U.S. needs to have a DHS/USCG presence for sovereignty, maritime 
domain awareness, search and rescue, marine environmental protection, anti-smuggling, 
illegal immigration, and maritime transportation management.184  Icebreakers are needed 
to ensure U.S. sovereignty and to preserve Freedom of Navigation claims in both the 
Northwest Passage and Northern Sea Routes. Defense interests require an increased DoD 
presence through the placement of an Arctic base or rotating vessels and personnel. 
Besides the USCG and DoD, other agencies such as Customs and Border Protection and 
DOE, amongst others, have an interest in the future of the Arctic, because it provides 
opportunities of expanded authorities and growth opportunities for each agency. As a 
result, it is vital that policy makers develop a guidance to ensure unity of effort. 
                                                 
184 Although Freedom of Navigation responsibility generally falls to the U.S. Navy, currently the 
Navy lacks the capability to deploy afloat units to the Arctic in the manner the U.S. Coast Guard can. 
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The other Arctic nations have detailed Arctic policy statements that provide a 
prescriptive method for dealing with the changing Arctic. The Arctic policies of most 
nations mainly contain a dual-track approach of diplomacy coupled with military and 
security objectives. The main gaps identified in the U.S. plan include providing a method 
for dealing with-long term Arctic governance, dealing with the needs of Native 
populations, and infrastructure development in the Arctic. 
1. Long-Term Maritime Governance  
Both the National Strategy for the Arctic Region and the previously released 
NSPD-66/HSPD-25 refer to the importance of “International Governance,” but unlike the 
plans of the seven other Arctic nations it does not - cannot - consider UNCLOS the 
cornerstone of maritime governance. This is likely due to the fact that the U.S. has failed 
to accede to UNCLOS. The U.S. plan calls for the Senate to “act favorably” on 
UNCLOS. The reasons opined upon in the plan (national security interests, protecting the 
Arctic environment and sovereignty) are the basis of the seven other Arctic nation’s 
policies.185  The U.S. plan makes mention of other international agreements, but none is 
as important to this region as UNCLOS.   
2. Native Population Needs 
The newly released National Strategy for the Arctic Region improved upon 
NSPD-66/HSPD-25, which makes little mention of the Alaskan Native population or the 
government’s current relationship with the tribes that dot the Arctic coastline. In contrast, 
the new strategy makes consultation and coordination with Alaska Natives a guiding 
principle of the strategy.186  The federal government will consult Alaska Natives to 
provide feedback on the effect of proposed policies.187  Currently, both the state of 
Alaska and the federal government have open and productive communications with the 
tribes of the Arctic. Alaska developed its operational plans with the needs of the native 
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subsistence hunters in mind; for example, meeting with the Native Whaling Commission 
to ensure whale migration patterns were not disturbed by planned operations. Unlike the 
lower-48 native American Indians, Alaskan Natives have different legislation governing 
how the federal government must coordinate and consult regarding issues such as land 
allocation and fishing rights. According to a native Inupiat in Barrow “the ocean means 
more than just food for native Alaskans. It’s the focus of the village’s community 
organization, its relationships and activities.”188. U.S. government agencies, working and 
operating in the Arctic, have well-developed plans for Alaska Native coordination and 
communication. Outreach by agencies, such as the Coast Guard, has been helpful in 
sharing information and building trust with the native villages that dot the Arctic Coast. 
By example, the Coast Guard currently has a civilian position out of its Juneau, Alaska 
regional headquarters dedicated to full-time native outreach across the state to ensure the 
Coast Guard remains engaged with tribes.  
Additionally, Alaska Native outreach is a priority in routine and emergency 
operations where tribes may be affected. The Coast Guard’s Admiral in charge of the 
Arctic region routinely communicates and visits with tribal leaders across the frozen 
north. In the event of a marine casualty or other maritime incident, the tribal leaders are 
consulted when appropriate and kept apprised of current and future operations. Other 
nations’ plans dedicate pages to their plans to synthesize Arctic planning with the 
indigenous populations of the Arctic while the U.S. has been doing so through the work 
of individual agencies working in a more piecemeal manner. As with her Arctic cousins, 
it is vital that as U.S. Arctic policy matures, the lines of communication remain strong 
with the Alaska Natives.  
3. Infrastructure Development 
The National Strategy for the Arctic Region lays out an imprecise and rather 
notional plan for the U.S. Arctic. It does so, while overlooking some basic problems with 
logistics and infrastructure in the region. Other nations’ plans address the need for better 
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ports, roads, and runways in the Arctic as a means of promoting security, safety, 
economic development, and sovereignty.  
The National Strategy for the Arctic Region does not address the lack of 
personnel and assets that would be required in the region. With the nearest deep-water 
port and USCG/DoD bases at well over 500 miles away, the U.S. Arctic lacks a year-
round USCG or DoD presence.189  Coast Guard icebreakers ply the Arctic waters on 
winter deployments for a short period of time, and recently non-icebreaker cutters with 
ice-strengthened hulls have been deployed to monitor offshore oil drilling operations in 
the summer months. Not all Coast Guard cutters are ice-strengthened. But with no 
adequate port facility in the region, the cutters must head south for fuel, provisioning, 
repairs, and port calls. Lack of port facilities would also pose a significant challenge in 
the event of marine incident such as a ship collision, allision, or oil spill. In May 2013, 
the United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), as a part of the Arctic Deep Draft 
ports study, released their Federal Register Notice on the intention to study the feasibility 
of improving navigation infrastructure in the Arctic. The USACE notice concludes that 
the current maritime infrastructure is not capable of meeting the current or future 
demands.190 
Although a USCG C-130 aircraft can land at the international airport in Barrow, 
the facility lacks storage space for aircraft and support activities. In 2012, without 
adequate Coast Guard hangar facilities, the USCG had to rent a hangar and invest 
significantly into refurbishing the facility to bring it up to service standards. Short-term 
accommodations and rental cars are very scarce, and  when available, are quite 
expensive. Food costs are also extremely high. In an environment of dwindling resources, 
these are real challenges. In the past, the Coast Guard has borrowed short-term sleeping 
space in the high-school gym, utilized tents, and had government vehicles 
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transported via aircraft for lack of better facilities. In order for the U.S. to attempt to meet 
the notional plans of the national Arctic strategy, U.S. agencies must have adequate 
infrastructure in order to operate. 
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V. PROJECT THE OUTCOMES AND CONFRONT THE TRADE-
OFFS—THE RISKS IN THE MARITIME DOMAIN IF THE U.S. 
DOES NOT CREATE AN EFFECTIVE ARCTIC POLICY 
A. RISK TO SAFETY OF LIFE AND PROPERTY AT SEA DUE TO A LACK 
OF SEARCH AND RESCUE (SAR) ASSETS AND FACILITIES 
Vessel traffic in the Arctic region is ever increasing due to the receding ice. U.S. 
Coast Guard District Seventeen in Juneau, Alaska, has been tracking data in the region. 
From 2008 to 2012, there was a 100 percent increase in traffic in the Arctic, from 120 
vessels transiting the region in 2008 to 250 in 2012 (see Figure 1). USCG figures show 
an increase in Bering Strait transits from 245 to 325 during 2008–2010.191  Vessel traffic 
is expected to increase even more in the future with Alaskan oil drilling and Northern Sea 
Route shipping.192  In one year alone, there was an increase of vessel traffic in U.S. 
waters from 85 vessels in 2011 to 110 vessels reported in 2012.193  This number does not 
include other vessels such as recreational, pleasure, and adventure-seeker vessels, that 
often go untracked and unreported. This increase was mainly attributed to exploratory 
drilling. Ultimately, Shell’s plans were cancelled late in the season due to persistent ice 
and equipment problems.194 Additionally, in 2010, only four ships carrying 111,000 tons 
of cargo made passage through the Arctic but in 2012, 46 did, carrying 1.26 million tons 
of cargo.195 
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The increase in vessel traffic also increases the risk of a search and rescue case. 
From a DHS/USCG and DoD perspective, the increased commerce means that agencies 
like the Coast Guard (which has 11 statutory missions to be executed in both U.S. and 
international waters) need a permanent presence in the Arctic to carry out those missions. 
Currently, with no permanent Coast Guard or Department of Defense presence, the U.S. 
lacks an acceptable level of Arctic MDA. As a part of Operation Arctic Shield 2012, the 
Coast Guard deployed 2 MH-60 helicopters to Barrow to respond to all USCG missions, 
including search and rescue. Unfortunately, the operation is seasonal and leaves the area 
vulnerable eight months of the year. Additionally, the bi-weekly seasonal Arctic Domain 
Awareness flights from Coast Guard Air Station Kodiak (2,000 miles round trip) are very 
expensive and lack first-responder capability due to the fixed wing platform. 
As a result, lives will be lost due to maritime mishaps and casualties as response 
assets are lacking.   The recent Arctic Shield 2012 operation last summer resulted in 
numerous SAR cases, where lives were saved due to the presence of cutters and aircraft 
in the Arctic. There are no permanently-based Search and Rescue (SAR) assets, SAR 
infrastructure, or polar icebreaking capability. Property and the environment will 
continue to be at risk. There is a lack of oil spill response capability, a lack of a maritime 
transportation system in the region, and no deep-water port capability. All of these 
capabilities and programs exist in the other coastal states and territories of the U.S. 
Nothing less should be tolerated in the Arctic region of the country. Additionally, the 
other Arctic nations have response resources and maintain sovereignty along their Arctic 
shores, putting the U.S. at a strategic and tactical disadvantage, and putting U.S. lives and 
resources at the mercy of foreign assistance. 
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Figure 1.   2008–2012 Arctic Activity (From U.S. Coast Guard District Seventeen, 2012) 
The growth of cruise vessel traffic in the Arctic brings with it the increased risk of 
maritime safety and security issues. After declining passenger numbers from 2009–2011, 
the industry saw a 7 percent growth in travelers to Alaska starting in 2012 to nearly 1 
million.196 
According to U.S. Coast Guard District Seventeen data from 2012 (Figure 2), 
both the HANSEATIC and the WORLD cruise vessels transited the Arctic. The WORLD 
has a capacity of 300 passengers and a crew of 250 and the HANSEATIC has a 
combination of 300 passengers and crew.197   
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Figure 2.   2012 Cruise Ships (From U.S. Coast Guard District Seventeen, 2012) 
Over the summer of 2012, the Coast Guard deployed 2 MH-60 Jayhawk 
helicopters to Barrow. The assets were pre-deployed to handle all missions including 
SAR. The aircraft has a maximum range of 700 NM with 7-hour endurance. The radius is 
300 NM with search capability of 15-minute and 30-minute hover. The recovery 
capability is six people per trip.198 The hourly cost of operating the MH-60 is 
approximately $11,500 according to the Coast Guard reimbursable standard rates.199  
With the Coast Guard’s limited presence in the Arctic, it would take days to rescue the 
passengers and crew off of a small cruise vessel such as the WORLD by helicopter in the 
rough waters of the Arctic where boat rescue may be impossible.  
As cruise ship traffic grows and routes extend into the Arctic, SAR capability and 
marine safety needs will grow in the region. Although the numbers are small today, a 
mass rescue operation would exhaust what little resources currently exist in the Arctic 
villages of Barrow and Nome. Even limited exposure to the frigid Arctic waters reduces 
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survivability to mere minutes. Currently, these potentially dire conditions exist in the 
Arctic due to inadequate maritime emergency response assets and lengthy distances result 
in prolonged response times.200  
As a step in the right direction, the Arctic Council negotiated an Arctic SAR 
agreement that was signed by the U.S. in 2011. The SAR Agreement entrusts Arctic 
nations to provide suitable assistance in the event of a marine incident and to measures to 
deal with emergent SAR needs in the Arctic region.201  Currently, the U.S. cannot 
respond as rapidly as the other Arctic nations and in the game of SAR every second 
counts especially in the frigid and unforgiving Arctic. 
1. Potential Environmental Damage, and Interruption of Native 
Subsistence Whaling/Fishing Due to a Lack of Oil Spill-Response 
Equipment  
Responding to, and cleaning up, an oil spill is very difficult; but responding to an 
oil spill in the Arctic Ocean is even more difficult. Besides the pristine and often ice-
choked waters, the Arctic region poses several challenges including logistics, lack of 
infrastructure, and extreme weather that make otherwise effective tools and assets useless 
in the harsh northern latitudes and persistent ice.202  An oil spill in the Arctic would hurt 
the native population the most: “If they have a catastrophe like in the Gulf of Mexico and 
that stuff seeps up in the ice and it floats up all around the Northern Hemisphere, it’s 
going to hurt our hunting. It’s going to ruin our source of food.”203 
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One of the eleven statutory missions of the Coast Guard is maritime 
environmental protection.204  Events such as the Exxon Valdez spill in 1989 in the 
pristine waters of Prince William Sound and the Deepwater Horizon spill in 2010 in the 
Gulf of Mexico highlighted the service’s ability to coordinate large-scale oil spill 
response operations. In accordance with the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90), the 
Coast Guard is the federal agency charged with overseeing and coordinating oil spill 
response to both large and small in U.S. waters.205  The response is coordinated with 
other federal, state, local, and commercial entities. 
As a part of the 2012 Arctic Shield Operation, and in order to test federal 
agencies’ capabilities and spilled oil-recovery technologies, the Coast Guard, in 
partnership with the Department of Defense (U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), 
U.S. Navy Supervisor of Salvage (SUPSALV), Joint-Task Force Alaska), staged an oil 
spill response exercise in the Arctic in the summer of 2012.206 The goal of the exercise 
was to test the participating organizations’ plans, policies, and procedures to respond to a 
spill. Another goal was to deploy and test different types of oil spill response equipment 
in the harsh Arctic environment.207  Specifically, the exercise tested the interoperability 
of oil spill response gear, as well as the logistics involved in doing a large environmental 
response in the remote waters of the U.S. Arctic.208 The results will be used as a basis for 
future research and development and potential procurement of Arctic oil spill response 
gear for the U.S. Coast Guard and Navy.  
The exercise was based on the scenario of a major blowout on commercial oil rig 
conducting exploratory drilling on the outer continental shelf of the United States. Under 
                                                 
204 By law, the Coast Guard has 11 missions: Ports, waterways, and coastal security, Drug 
interdiction, Aids to navigation, Search and rescue, Living marine resources, Marine safety, Defense 
readiness, Migrant interdiction, Marine environmental protection, Ice operations, Other law enforcement. 
http://www.uscg.mil/top/missions/. 
205 33 United States Code §2701 et seq.  
206 The U.S. Coast Guard is armed force under Title 10 U.S. Code. Additionally, the Coast Guard is 
both a law enforcement agency and a federal regulatory agency. 
207 Arctic Shield 2012 Spilled Oil Response System (SORS) Deployment FTX, Exercise Plan (July 
30, 2012). 
208 Arctic Shield 2012 Spilled Oil Response System (SORS) Deployment AAR (August 31, 2012), 4. 
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the exercise plan, the spill would drift towards environmentally sensitive areas of nearby 
Barrow, Alaska.209  The spill was classified as a Spill of National Significance (SONS). 
According to 40 CFR 300.5 the term ‘spill of national significance (SONS)’ means “a 
spill that due to its severity, size, location, actual or potential impact on the public health 
and welfare or the environment, or the necessary response effort, is so complex that it 
requires extraordinary coordination of federal, state, local, and responsible party 
resources to contain and clean up the discharge.”210 
The gear that was deployed and tested included the Coast Guard’s Spilled Oil 
Recovery System (SORS), which has been standard issue aboard 225-foot Juniper Class 
seagoing buoy tenders stationed throughout the U.S. coast and the U.S. territories. The 
SORS system was successfully employed during the Deepwater Horizon Spill in 2010 in 
the Gulf of Mexico.211  Second, the U.S. Coast Guard Research and Development Center 
in Groton, Connecticut was testing the newly designed and developed Polar Bear 
system.212  Lastly, Navy SUPSALV was testing the Current Buster system.213  All 
testing was conducted from the U.S. Coast Guard cutter SYCAMORE (WLB-209), 
which is home-ported in Cordova, Alaska.   
With respect to lessons learned, logistics proved to be very challenging because 
the Arctic Coast of the United States lacks infrastructure such a deep-water port facility 
to on or off-load equipment. As a result, the SUPSALV gear was transported hundreds of 
miles over the Haul Road from southern Alaska to the Prudhoe Bay in three containers 
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and put on a barge for transport and deployment.214  The SORS gear and Polar Bear 
systems were loaded on to the cutter SYCAMORE prior to departure from its homeport. 
This may prove to be a large logistics hurdle in the event of oil spills where gear must be 
transported and deployed on-scene. A lesson learned was to have the Coast Guard, as the 
principal response agency, to acquire an offshore capable barge to pre-stage equipment 
such as SORS gear and additional boom.215  This would come at great financial cost if 
ever needed.  
Testing uncovered some technical problems with the current SORS system used 
on Coast Guard cutters. For example, the collapsible fabric bladder used for recovered oil 
storage once it is skimmed from the surface of the water cannot be used in the Arctic due 
to the harsh weather environment. For recovering spilled oil in the Arctic a large barge or 
tanks must be utilized due the extreme weather and ice conditions, which render the 
fabric bladder useless.216 
Another lesson learned was that because the Arctic Ocean has been covered with 
ice for thousands of years, it is not well charted for depths and hazards compared to other 
coastal areas of the United States. For this exercise, a HYPAC bathymetric survey system 
was utilized aboard the cutter and the small boat to chart the water depths, and to prevent 
groundings. This technology allowed the vessels to work more independently to recover 
spilled oil in rather treacherous conditions with unmarked or charted hazards.217 A 
comprehensive review of depths and hazards in the waters of the Arctic Ocean would 
require assets and funding. Additionally, with a large of deep-water port facilities, the 
vessels being used for oil spill recovery may be required to transport personnel and gear 
to and from shore.  
During the course of the exercise, it was determined that the best technology for 
spilled oil recovery in the Arctic marine environment is the one that is optimized based 
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on the combination of ice, weather (current and sea state), and amount of oil encountered. 
Over the course of the three-day exercise, numerous ice concentration conditions and 
weather scenarios were observed within the same 10-nautical-mile-square exercise area. 
On August 6, 2012, at U.S. Coast Guard Air Station (Kodiak, Alaska), Coast 
Guard Commandant Admiral Robert Papp testified before a Senate Committee on 
Appropriations, Subcommittee on Homeland Security field hearing titled “U.S. Coast 
Guard Operations in Alaska,” saying, “while prevention is critical, the Coast Guard must 
be able to manage the response to pollution incidents where responsible parties are not 
known or fail to adequately respond.”218  Although this 2012 joint DoD–Coast Guard 
spilled oil response exercise helps advance the direction of the service chief and improve 
the U.S. government’s ability to respond to an incident, it requires significant investment 
in assets, research and development, and infrastructure in the region to improve and apply 
the lessons learned.  
Besides the logistical challenges of operating in the Arctic without a deep-water 
port or pre-staged assets and equipment, the Alaskan Natives who reside on the Arctic 
Ocean depend upon the ocean for subsistence. According to the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Agency (NOAA), the Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission apportions the 
International Whaling Commission quota among the eleven Eskimo villages of northern 
Alaska.219  Alaska Natives rely on the subsistence hunting and whaling to feed their 
families and villages. 
A marine casualty resulting in an oil spill would be devastating to the marine 
environment and the subsistence hunts.  “For a lot of people, I guess at the end of the day 
they probably won’t see any economic benefit out of it, or very little. Yet everyday 
they’ll take a risk with the food out there that is available and accessible to us all out 
there. Some people derive benefit while the entire population takes the risk and of course 
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that’s what played out in the Gulf of Mexico.”220  Due to the lack of alternative food 
sources, this could set off a potential humanitarian disaster because whale meat is a 
staple. 
2. Risk To Sovereignty/ Natural Resource Claims Due to Not Acceding 
to UNCLOS 
United States accession to UNCLOS is critical to ensure sovereignty in the Arctic. 
UNCLOS provides specific guidance for dealing with maritime borders disputes and the 
outer continental shelf claims through an international tribunal and arbitration.221  
Currently as a non-signatory to UNCLOS, the U.S. is not able to avail itself of these 
provisions and can only engage bi-laterally as needed. 
The consequences of this are becoming increasingly clear in relationships with 
Canada and Russia, with whom the U.S has active maritime border disputes. The U.S. is 
in dispute with the Russian Federation over the Bering Strait and with Canada over the 
waters of the Northwest Passage (NWP). The NWP crosses over North America, in an 
area that Canada claims are internal waters not subject to the conventions of “innocent 
passage” as established under customary international law and UNCLOS. On the 
contrary, the U.S. regards the waters of the NWP as an international strait for 
navigational purposes, through which ships can pass without interference by the coastal 
state (Canada).222  The opening of the Northwest Passage would have a global impact on 
marine transportation. It would cut shipping routes between ports in Asia and U.S. east 
coast by nearly 5,000 miles.223  Due to a lack of standing under the UCLOS treaty, the 
                                                 
220 Living on Earth, “Native Alaskans and Offshore Drilling” ( January 4, 2011), 
http://www.loe.org/shows/segments.html?programID=11-P13–00002&segmentID=2. 
221 Marc Sonntag and Felix Lüth, “Who Owns the Arctic? A Stocktaking of Territorial Disputes,” The 
Global Journal (December 21, 2011),  http://theglobaljournal.net/article/view/439/. 
222 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Annex II. Commission on the limits of the 
Continental Shelf, 1982, Article 19, “Passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good 
order or security of the coastal State. Such passage shall take place in conformity with this Convention and 
with other rules of international law,” http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention 
_agreements/texts/unclos/part2.htm. 
223 Charles Ebinger and Evie Zambetkis, The Geopolitics of Arctic Melt. International Affairs Vol. 85 
(June 2009), 1221, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2009/11/arctic percent20melt 
percent20ebinger percent20zambetakis/11_arctic_melt_ebinger_zambetakis.pdf. 
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U.S. is arguing from a position of weakness with respect to the statuses of the Northwest 
Passage, the Northern Sea Route, and the Bering Strait and the subsequent threat to 
Freedom of Navigation. 
Additionally, UNCLOS contains specific provisions for extended Outer 
Continental Shelf (OCS) claims. Besides massive deposits of oil and gas, the Arctic 
contains major mineral deposits such as nickel, iron ore, tin, uranium, copper, and other 
rare earth minerals. Every Arctic nation is accessing locations and methods to extract 
these resources.224  In the massive land grab for natural resource rich areas that has been 
going on between the other seven Arctic nations, the U.N. as detailed in UNLCOS is the 
arbiter. As a non-party, the U.S. is left out in the cold with respect to OCS claims. The 
OCS is rich in natural resources and opportunities for positive economic impact. 
According to the U.S. Geological Service, the U.S. Arctic contains 29.96 billion barrels 
of oil and 72 billion barrels of natural gas (about 33 percent of technically recoverable oil 
and 18 percent of technically recoverable gas in the entire Arctic).225 Although the U.S. 
abides by the rules of UNCLOS without having ratified it, it trails behind the remainder 
of the Arctic states on its policy and in asserting its presence in the region.226  Signing 
and ratifying UNCLOS, like Canada, would prove to be an excellent framework for 
shaping U.S. Arctic policy and advancing the current blueprint for the region. 
Some may argue that U.S. does not need UNCLOS due to the Arctic Council and 
the active role the U.S. has taken. Despite raising awareness about Arctic issues, the 
Arctic Council lacks any regulatory authority or the power to address military issues.227  
As a result, the Arctic Council is limited in overall effectiveness and accession to 
UNCLOS is a better avenue to assert U.S. sovereignty in the region.   
                                                 
224 Heather Conley, “A New Security Architecture for the Arctic–an American Perspective,” Center 
for Strategic and International Studies (January 2012). 
225 Robert Gardner, “U.S. Must ratify Law of the Sea Convention,”  American Security Project (June 
13, 2012), http://americansecurityproject.org/blog/2012/us-must-ratify-law-of-sea-convention/. 
226 Ebinger and Zambetkis, “The Geopolitics of Arctic Melt,” International Affairs Vol. 85 (June 
2009), 1223, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2009/11/arctic percent20melt 
percent20ebinger percent20zambetakis/11_arctic_melt_ebinger_zambetakis.pdf. 
227 Conley and Kraut, “U.S. Strategic Interest in the Arctic An Assessment of Current Challenges and 
New Opportunities for Cooperation,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 13.   
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3. Maritime Domain Awareness as a Means of Increasing Sovereignty 
Another method of extending sovereignty is through maritime domain awareness. 
Currently, some information in the Arctic is shared between various agencies, such as the 
Departments of Defense (Alaska Command/U.S. NORTHCOM), Commerce (NOAA), 
Homeland Security (USCG, CBP, ICE), Transportation (FAA), Interior (oil/gas permits), 
and State (foreign research). The purposes range from commercial and safety interests 
with DOI/DOE to security and homeland defense interests with the DoD/DHS agencies. 
In 2009, General Renuart, commander U.S. NORTHCOM stated, “we need to expand 
this satellite capability into the Arctic region. The Arctic will continue to be an area 
where more and more research is accomplished. There is more traffic in that region. 
Whether you are an expert in global warming or not, the fact is there is more water there 
every day than there has been in the past; that breeds competition for resources. Fishing, 
oil, gas, gold—all will encourage people to be more present in the Arctic region, where 
our communications are not up-to-speed.”228  This past summer, the USCG and 
NORTHCOM engaged in joint exercises in the Arctic to test compatibilities and inter-
operability.229 
With limited government partners in the region, opportunities to share data and 
information would allow for a greater collaboration and collective MDA and security. 
Local community members provide valuable information on both suspicious activity and 
activity of interest. Government outreach and engagement in the local communities has 
been vital at gaining trust and contacts to ground truth other reports. 
Notice of Arrival reports provide important queuing information on vessels 
arriving into U.S. ports and are required under U.S. law following changes made after the 
September 11, 2001 attacks.230  Additional information is obtained from C-130 Arctic 
                                                 
228 Remarks by General Gene Renuart at the AFCEA Solutions Series Conference, Washington, D.C., 
(May 5, 2009). 
229 Hannah Heimbuch, “Coast Guard mission in Arctic morphs in response to needs of coastal 
Alaskans,” Alaska Dispatch, November 8, 2012, http://www.alaskadispatch.com/article/coast-guard-
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230 33 Code of Federal Regulations Part 160. U.S. law requires foreign vessels and U.S. commercial 
vessels to provide 96 hour advanced notice of arrival before calling on a U.S. port. 
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Domain Awareness flights, cutter sighting reports, and community outreach. Current 
systems provide limited MDA of vessels required to carry and transmit AIS, LRIT and 
VMS. While this provides visibility of larger vessels, smaller vessels and those with these 
systems disabled go undetected due to lack of radar coverage. Additionally, until recent 
changes, visibility of commercial vessel traffic transiting the Russian side of the Bering 
Strait would often go undetected, or would require using expensive and license limiting 
tracking and shipping information from commercial sources such as Lloyd’s Fairplay.231 
Increased MDA is vital to ensuring U.S. interests are served in the region. Nations 
such as China have been active in the Arctic by deploying new icebreakers to conduct 
scientific research and seek additional sources of natural resources in the region.232  Also, 
Russia and Canada have been flexing their sovereign muscles in the Northern Sea Route 
and Northwest Passage seeking greater control and economic advantage versus 
cooperation with flag states utilizing these routes. 
In order to maintain an acceptable level of Arctic MDA, the government needs to 
continue to leverage technology, invest in systems and encourage collaboration and 
information sharing between partners such as the Coast Guard, U.S. NORTHCOM, and 
commercial maritime companies. Improvements in methods for collecting vessel-tracking 
data, international cooperation with respect to the NSR and NWP, and increased presence 
of operational units of the DoD and USCG will assist in enhancing the overall the 
common-operating picture and sovereignty in the region. 
                                                 
231 Lloyd’s Fairplay, http://www.fairplay.co.uk/. 
232  No author, “Icebreaker is 1st Chinese vessel to cross Arctic Ocean,” Associated Press (September 
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VI. FINDINGS/CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The National Strategy for the Arctic Region lacks a clear course of action, 
authority, and funding to implement the measures proposed that should be found in a 
comprehensive strategic Arctic policy. Beyond that, the policy needs to explain the 
impending U.S. strategic interests in the region: a melting Arctic will open sea-lanes and 
maritime commerce balanced with a need to protect the fragile Arctic environment. This 
will require the U.S. to have a DHS/USCG presence for sovereignty, maritime domain 
awareness, search and rescue, marine environmental protection, anti-smuggling, illegal 
immigration, and maritime transportation management. Icebreakers are needed to ensure 
U.S. sovereignty and Freedom of Navigation claims in both the Northwest Passage and 
Northern Sea Routes. Defense interests require an increased DoD presence through the 
placement of an Arctic base or rotating vessels and personnel. 
As demonstrated, the other Arctic nations have mainly taken a dual-track 
approach (diplomacy and militarily) to Arctic policy. U.S. Arctic policy should be a 
quad-track approach (diplomacy, homeland security, defense, and commerce). The plan 
should express measurable actions on the part of the U.S. to advance policy interests in 
the Arctic. Specifically, the plan should direct the building of bases, ports, the signing of 
UNCLOS, and asset acquisition while naming a lead federal agency for Arctic issues. 
A. COORDINATION AND DESIGNATION OF A LEAD FEDERAL 
AGENCY 
The federal agency strategy should establish an inter-governmental coordination 
committee between the Department of State, Department of Defense, Department of 
Interior, Department of Energy, Department of Homeland Security, Alaskan natives from 
the Arctic, and the State of Alaska to work in concert to carry out the plan. Although 
many ad hoc groups have been set up, the strategy should lay out the specific commerce, 
security, defense, and sovereignty issues within these agencies in the Arctic, and what is 
needed for them to carry out the plan. This will also prevent agencies from creating 
separate Arctic policy plans and strategies, which may or may not fit in with the overall 
 76 
whole-of-government approach, and may quickly wither away without funding or inter-
agency assistance. For example, the Coast Guard recently released the service’s Arctic 
Strategy out front of other agencies, and close in time with the national strategy. It 
provides the service’s view of how the Coast Guard will operate in the region over the 
next decade; but was not made in coordination with other agencies operating in the 
region. Only time will tell if that was a strategically smart move. 
The committee should be empowered and funded by the President and Congress 
to carry out the mandate. The plan would also name an executive agent for the 
committee. DHS should be named as the executive agent, due to the overarching DHS 
missions (mainly from the Coast Guard) that are required in the Arctic. 
As a method of ensuring coordination, the Administration needs to name a lead 
federal agency for the Arctic. Due to the range of missions and authorities and the 
maritime environment of the U.S. Arctic, the Coast Guard would be a logical choice. As 
a military service, federal law enforcement agency, and regulator of commercial vessels, 
the Coast Guard spans the chasm between military and civil agencies and works well 
both within a chain-of-command, as a member of the maritime community in an incident 
command response, and with the public. Events like the Hurricane Katrina response have 
showcased the Coast Guard’s ability to coordinate, lead, and execute a complicated and 
complex mission. Although the Coast Guard has declared themselves the lead federal 
agency in their Arctic Strategy, it will take a mandate requiring funding, as well as 
reinforcement from Congress and the President, to push the rest of the federal 
government to accept the Coast Guard in this role. 
B. INFRASTRUCTURE 
The Arctic needs additional infrastructure to include roads, ferries for 
transportation, and living or housing space for temporary visitors and workers. At a 
minimum, the plan should include the direction and funding for at least one deep-water 
port in the Arctic. The number of vessels transiting into the Arctic is increasing 
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exponentially.233  Currently, vessels need to tender small vessels for delivery of food and 
fuel in the Arctic. Government and industry are working on a plan to study the concept, 
but without a national directive, progress has been slow.234 
As the Arctic ice recedes, marine traffic from fishing vessels, container vessels, 
and bulk carriers will continue to increase. A deep-water port would be strategic from a 
defense, homeland security, and commercial perspective.235  Construction of a deep-
water port will also lead to greater economic development in the region, including 
development of other necessary infrastructure to support increased human activity in the 
region. Implementation of the development of infrastructure would require Congress to 
provide funding and direction to set aside federal land in the Arctic for a base and 
logistics hub. The work being undertaken by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers should 
be re-doubled in order to locate suitable locations for a port facility to service the region. 
In an effort to kick start operations, the Navy could utilize the Seabees to develop piers, 
landing strips, and hangars, if needed.  
C. MULTI-USE/JOINT BASE 
The plan should include direction and funding for both defense and Coast Guard 
facilities in the Arctic, which could be shared. With no hangar or air facility in the area, 
the only flights currently arriving are long-range aircraft (C-130). They travel from nearly 
1,000 miles away to conduct Arctic Domain Awareness flights and have very limited 
landing location options in the Arctic due to the poor infrastructure. Furthermore, there is 
no permanent search and rescue capability, oil spill response, maritime transportation 
system management, or surface response assets in the Arctic. A permanent base is needed 
to help establish maritime domain awareness and ensure sovereignty in the region. 
According to the State of Alaska’s Northern Waters Task Force, “the Coast Guard must 
                                                 
233  Alex Demarban, “Begich panel considers deepwater port to support Arctic shipping,” Alaska 
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have a greater overall presence in the Arctic, with the ability to stage assets closer to 
future shipping, oil and gas drilling, and commercial fishing activities.”236 
Implementation and development of an Arctic Command would require 
significant cooperation between the Coast Guard (DHS) and Navy (DoD) as the main 
direction, focus, and operations of the command would be the maritime domain.  It starts 
with direction from the President and funding from the Congress to help alleviate a turf 
war. The newly established law and regulations would need to clearly state who is in 
charge of what and who will contribute resources. Models such as the Australian Border 
Protection Command and the U.S. Joint Inter-Agency Task Force model provide 
templates for a structure. Currently, U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) owns the water 
from a DoD perspective, but NORTHCOM owns the lands of the U.S. Arctic through 
Joint Task Force-Alaska.237  The Coast Guard has significant resources (personnel, 
aircraft and vessels) in the Alaskan area of operations, which encompasses the U.S. 
Arctic out to the edge of the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Since most of the 
focus is on the resources and shipping and not from any land threat, the greater 
coordination would be between U.S. Pacific Command and the new Arctic entity.  
Both services are stretched very thinly, but like the two services have done with 
Harbor Defense Commands—which are joint Navy-Coast Guard commands that deploy 
overseas to engage in port security missions—they can work well together. In the 2007 
Cooperative Strategy for twenty-first century Sea Power, the Commandants of both the 
Coast Guard and Marine Corps (USMC), along with the Chief of Naval Operations, 
vowed to work closely on maritime operations worldwide.238  In this agreement, the U.S. 
sea services spotlighted the importance of cooperative relationships as the basis for 
maritime security and could serve as the basis for a joint Arctic command. The agreement 
                                                 
236 Alaska Northern Waters Task Force Findings and Recommendations, 2012, 
http://housemajority.org/joule/pdfs/27/hjr0034_anwtf_recommendations.pdf , Alaska Northern Waters 
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aims to project America’s sea power in a way that protects U.S. vital and domestic 
interests, even as it promotes greater collective security and stability.   
D. ICEBREAKER CONSTRUCTION 
The Arctic plan needs direction and funding for new heavy polar icebreakers.239  
Heavy icebreakers are critical to ensure logistical needs are met, shipping lanes are open 
for maritime traffic, and to undertake vital scientific research. The current polar breakers 
were built in the early 1970s with an expected 30-year life span. The vessels have served 
both the Arctic and Antarctic regions. The recently reactivated U.S. Coast Guard Cutter 
POLAR STAR was put back into active service through a multi-year, multi-million dollar 
overhaul to extend the service life by an estimated 25 years.240  The only other active 
icebreaker is the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter HEALY, which is not a heavy breaker. A plan 
is also in place for an additional Coast Guard heavy polar icebreaker, but that will not be 
able to fully meet the growing need for a presence in the region alone, or in a timely 
manner. 
A lack of icebreaking capability will leave the U.S. lagging far behind the other 
Arctic nations, and other non-Arctic nations investing in these assets, who are making 
strategic decisions to expand their breaker fleets now. For example, Russia has over 20 
heavy icebreaking vessels and is building more ships.241  China and India, although not 
Arctic nations, are also building icebreakers and are poised to capitalize on their interest 
and hegemony in the region.242  Across the Arctic, the U.S. lags far behind in polar 
icebreaker capability: Finland has eight vessels, Sweden has seven vessels, Canada has 
                                                 
239 Committee on the Assessment of U.S. Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker Roles and Future Needs, 
National Research Council, Polar Icebreaker Roles and U.S. Future Needs: A Preliminary Assessment. 
Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2005. Heavy icebreakers are defined as vessels capable 
of breaking 6 feet of ice continuously at 3 knots, and can back and ram through at least 20 feet of ice. 
240 U.S. Coast Guard Fact Sheet Fiscal Year 2013 President’s Budget. 
http://www.uscg.mil/posturestatement/docs/FY_2013_Budget_Fact_Sheet.pdf. 
241 Ronald O’Rourke, “Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker Modernization: Background and Issues for 
Congress,” Congressional Research Service, June 14, 2012, 22, 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL34391.pdf. 
242 No author, “India to acquire icebreaker worth Rs 800 cr for polar exploration,” The Times of India, 
June 2, 2013, http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2013–06–02/science/39690091_1_xuelong-hi-
tech-ship-icebreaker. 
 80 
eight vessels, and Denmark has four vessels.243  (Denmark, Iceland??)  Recently, 
Congress allocated $8 million to the U.S. Coast Guard towards design of a new heavy 
polar icebreaker. Construction will cost $850 million.244  But this is not enough to 
effectively manage the polar icebreaking mission in the changing Arctic. Despite limited 
budgets, the U.S. needs to invest in additional icebreakers to maintain the maritime 
transportation system, advance U.S. security and sovereignty interests, and continue 
scientific research. The major implementation challenge for icebreaker construction is the 
funding required by Congress to allow the Coast Guard to construct additional vessels. 
E. UNCLOS 
UNCLOS must be the legal bedrock of U.S. Arctic policy. UNCLOS is the 
framework of cooperation within the region. Other nations have rejected the push for an 
Arctic treaty, like the Antarctic Treaty, favoring instead the UNCLOS structure.245  By 
ratifying UNCLOS, the U.S. will advance a “remarkable treaty that expands U.S. 
sovereign rights, powerfully serves U.S. needs for the Navy and the Coast Guard, and 
provides American industry with the security necessary to generate jobs and growth.”246  
By joining the UNCLOS alliance, the U.S. will be better able to settle maritime claims 
and disputes between other Arctic nations on issues such as outer continental shelf and 
maritime boundary line issues. The U.S. will also be in a better position to challenge the 
jurisdictional claims of both Russia (Northern Sea Route) and Canada (Northwest 
Passage). Only through UNCLOS can the U.S. make rightful claim to the Extended 
Continental Shelf and the natural resources within it. Implementation requires 
Congressional action and pressure by the Administration to get UNCLOS to a vote in the 
Senate. 
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The current state of U.S. Arctic policy leaves lives at risk, natural resources 
unrealized, along with marine wildlife and the Arctic Alaskan Native way-of-life 
woefully unprotected. Other Arctic nations are reaping the benefits of the opening of the 
far north, while the U.S. watches and waits with no meaningful ability to enforce, police, 
or respond in the region. By creating a U.S. Arctic committee, with the legal and fiscal 
authority to establish and execute Arctic policy and directing specific measures such as 
icebreaker construction, infrastructure development, building of a joint U.S. base and 
ratifying UNCLOS, the U.S. can move forward in the region to more fully support 
Alaskan Natives, industry, defense, and homeland security needs to protect U.S. interests 
and sovereignty in the future.  
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